In the Zone: Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Village in TIF Dispute with Schools and more...

In the Zone: Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Village in TIF Dispute with Schools

In 2004, a village in Illinois established a tax-increment financing district (TIF #1) to revitalize its town center. In 2021 (6 years before the expiration of TIF #1), the village passed several ordinances to create a new TIF district comprised entirely of parcels of land that were previously included in the original TIF district’s redevelopment area (TIF #2). The majority of the parcels in TIF #2 are owned by a local hospital network, which entered into a redevelopment agreement with the village to increase parking for its facilities and facilitate the development of a mixed-use commercial building. Due to delays in the approval processes, the redevelopment of the hospital site began prior to adoption of the ordinance establishing TIF #2.

Two local school districts filed a lawsuit against the village, claiming that the newly established TIF #2 was invalid because it did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a “conservation area” subject to TIF treatment. The school districts claimed that the ongoing redevelopment activity by the hospital (prior to establishment of TIF #2) showed there was no need for tax-increment financing to spur development. Additionally, the school districts claimed that the process of removing parcels from TIF #1 only to include those same parcels in TIF #2 was an unlawful attempt to extend the 23-year lifespan imposed for TIF districts under the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Act).

The trial court ruled in favor of the village, finding it adequately established that the area comprising TIF #2 met the minimum criteria to be deemed a “conservation area” eligible for tax-increment financing. More specifically, the trial court determined that the village had shown there was (1) a lack of community planning, (2) a lagging equalized assessed value (EAV) in the proposed TIF #2 area compared with the rest of the village, and (3) deterioration of parcels within the TIF #2 area. The trial court also determined that the de-TIF/re-TIF process of removing parcels from one TIF district to enroll them in another was not prohibited by the Act.

The school districts appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Appellate Court upheld the ruling in favor of the village. On the issue of TIF #2’s designation as a conservation area, the Appellate Court first determined that the village had not erred in finding that the designated area would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without implementation of TIF #2 and the associated redevelopment plan. While the hospital campus was being actively redeveloped when TIF #2 was established, the Court determined that this activity was clearly supported by the promise of tax-increment financing—in other words, the redevelopment activity and establishment of TIF #2 worked in tandem to stimulate revitalization of the site. The Court further affirmed that the village properly established the 3 eligibility criteria (lack of planning, lagging EAV, and deterioration) to designate TIF #2 as a conservation area.

The Appellate Court also determined that the de-TIF/re-TIF process for the parcels removed from TIF #1 and enrolled in TIF #2 was valid. The Court acknowledged that, to extend the life of a TIF district, municipalities must seek approval from the Illinois General Assembly. However, the Court found TIF #2 was sufficiently distinct from TIF #1, and therefore the de-TIF/re-TIF was not an invalid extension without legislature approval. The Appellate Court observed that nothing prohibits a parcel of land from being placed in a new TIF district after removal from another. Furthermore, the Court noted that the base EAV values had been reset upon the village’s creation of TIF #2, which effectively allowed the other local taxing bodies to receive tax revenue based on EAVs calculated in 2021 rather than 2004. Therefore, the facts and circumstances underlying the creation of TIF #2 did not suggest an unlawful extension of the original TIF #1.

Board of Education of Winfield S.D. 34, et al. v. Village of Winfield

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Government in Malicious Prosecution Case

In Hill v. Cook County, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a circuit court’s ruling in favor of government defendants in a malicious prosecution claim.

An arrestee sued the county, the county sheriff, and a municipality and various police officers for claims arising from an arrest in connection with an alleged armed robbery. The arrestee claimed that upon his arrest, he entered into an agreement with police that he would not be rearrested or charged in connection with the incident if he passed a polygraph test.

At his criminal trial, the court found the agreement unenforceable because a prosecutor was not involved in the agreement. Subsequently, the arrestee was sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery convictions.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred in finding his arrest agreement with police invalid. While his appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Stapinski, holding that prosecutors could be bound by agreements made by police officers, and his agreement with police was later found valid and his conviction was vacated.

After his conviction was vacated, he filed an action for malicious prosecution against the government defendants. Because the vacation of his conviction was based on contract law and due process principles, and not the probability of his innocence, the Appellate Court held that the government defendants could not be held liable for malicious prosecution, and the trial court's ruling in favor of the government defendants was proper.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Addresses Claims Against Municipality by Tree Vendor

An Illinois Appellate Court dismissed most of the claims in a lawsuit filed by a vendor against a municipality, although it allowed an unjust enrichment claim and a fradulent misrepresentation claim to move forward in the circuit court. Johns Pro-Tree Service v. Village of Dolton.

A mayor and two village public works employees reached out to the president of a tree service company for emergency tree trimming and removal service related to a storm in June 2023. After the parties agreed to a price, the tree company completed the work. Subsequently, the parties agreed to continue the services to the village, and the village paid the full invoice amount. On September 25th, the company submitted another invoice for their work, but was told that none of the village’s vendors would be paid for their recent work due to budget restrictions. The company filed a lawsuit against the village claiming breach of contract, a violation of the Local Government Prompt Payment Act, fraudulent misrepresentation, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court dismissed the case in its entirety, finding that the village was immune from liability and the alleged contract was not enforceable because it had not been approved or ratified by the village's board of trustees.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the breach of contract, Prompt Payment Act, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel claims.

On the breach of contract claim, the Appellate Court held that the complaint did not show that the contract was approved by the board of trustees or that the board had delegated contracting authority to the mayor or other officials or otherwise authorized the contract with the tree service contract. As a result, the tree service company's claim that the village had breached a contract with the company was properly dismissed by the circuit court.

The Appellate Court also held that because the breach of contract claim was properly dismissed, the Local Government Payment Act claim was also properly dismissed.

On the company's quantum meruit claim, the Appellate Court found that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to show that the board of trustees authorized the proper officials to accept or approve the terms of the transaction with the tree service company.

The Appellate Court also upheld the dismissal of the company's promissory estoppel claim finding that the company did not establish that the representatives of the village involved with the tree company had authority to make any representations or promises to the company.

However, the Appellate Court disagreed with the circuit court on the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, finding that the village did not meet the burden of proof by showing they were immune under the Tort Immunity Act.

The Court also disagreed with the dismissal of the tree company's unjust enrichment claim, finding that this claim was adequately pled in the complaint to survive a dismissal.

As a result, the Court sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings on the company's fraudulent mispresentation and unjust enrichment claims.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Appellate Court Upholds Demolition Order But Limits Municipal Fines

In County of DuPage v. Arjmand, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a demolition order issued by a circuit court in favor of a county, but reversed portions of the circuit court's order imposing fines on the property owner.

A property owner owned a partially constructed and vacant property. According to the county, the property contained numerous unsafe and hazardous conditions, including broken windows, graffiti, mold, and structural issues, and became a site for trespassing and other illicit activities. After the owner failed to address all of the code issues, the county filed a complaint against the owner alleging that the residence was an unsafe structure, public nuisance, lacked a valid building permit, and violated various provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code.

The circuit court ruled in favor of the county on all counts in 2021 and issued a demolition order for 2022. The court also imposed fines, fees, and costs against the property owner. The owner appealed, raising four issues on appeal: (1) the validity of demolition order, (2) the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county, (3) the validity of the imposed fines, and (4) the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself.

The Appellate Court upheld the demolition order in favor of the county, finding that despite the owner taking some remedial measures, the property remained dangerous and unsafe, and the owner had more than reasonable time to repair the property.

As to the owner's appeal of the fines imposed by the court, the Appellate Court determined that fines for ordinance violations must be calculated for violations up to the date of the court order, not after the order is issued. The court also rejected the issuance of prejudgment fines on certain of the counts and sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

The Appellate Court also rejected the property owner's claim that the judge should have recused himself.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

PAC Finds FOIA Violation in Response to Request for Termination Letter

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a State's Attorney's Office (SAO) seeking records about a former SAO employee who was terminated and criminally charged for alleged misconduct while working at the SAO. The SAO withheld a responsive termination letter on the basis that the letter, if disclosed, would interfere with a pending criminal prosecution and picking of a jury.

After the requester submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), the PAC issued its second binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the SAO improperly withheld the termination letter. PAC Op. 26-002.

First, the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Section 7(1)(d) only apply to records either (1) created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings, or (2) if the record is maintained by a correctional or law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes. In this case, the PAC determined that the termination letter was not created during the course in the course of an administrative enforcement proceeding. The PAC also determined that the letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” because the letter was a personnel record created by the SAO to document a former employee’s termination. Because the withheld letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) did not apply to allow the SAO to withhold the record.

Second, the PAC determined that the SAO did not demonstrate that disclosing the letter would interfere with law enforcement proceedings or create a substantial likelihood that a person would be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing. Although the SAO argued that the court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of information in the letter, the PAC reasoned that FOIA does not provide a blanket exemption for records that may contain information that may be inadmissible in court. The PAC found that the SAO did not illustrate that revealing previously undisclosed information in the letter is likely to garner intense pre-trial publicity that could taint the pool of potential jurors in the county. Even if some potential jurors were exposed to the letter, the PAC argued that the SAO could use judicial safeguards, like voir dire, to identify and exclude potential jurors whose knowledge of relevant information may taint their impartiality. While the letter contains allegations that have not been publicly disseminated or reported on, the PAC reasoned that disclosing the letter would not interfere with the prosecution of the former SAO employee, because it does not contain highly specific details (e.g., identities of witnesses, sensitive details that would materially impact witness testimony, or evidentiary proof or sources of evidence) that would interfere with a law enforcement proceeding.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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