Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI and more...

Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed the appeal by a former police officer of a pension board's denial of pension benefits because he violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules when he filed an appellate brief almost wholly created with the aid of artificial intelligence (AI). Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board.

The plaintiff was hired as a police officer in 2003, and filed an application for a non-duty disability pension in 2020. He subsequently withdrew his application, and returned to full duty. In 2022, he was placed on a performance improvement plan for certain violations of department orders and policies. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second application for a non-duty disability pension. The pension board held a hearing on the application and ultimately denied his application, finding that the officer's condition could have been remedied with medication, which the pension board found the officer refused to regularly to take.

The officer filed a complaint for administrative review with the trial court to appeal the pension board's decision, along with a brief supporting his complaint. In his brief, he cited to several cases that did not exist. At the hearing, the officer also attempted to introduce new evidence and exhibits that were not part of the original hearing. The pension board brought the nonexistent cases to the attention of the trial court and objected to the introduction of new evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court upheld the pension board's denial of his pension application.

The officer then appealed to the Appellate Court. After he filed his brief with the Appellate Court, the pension board filed a response and a motion for sanctions alleging that the officer violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules for fictitious citations to the administrative record, citations to nonexistent cases, and fictitious holdings from actual cases. The Appellate Court noted that all parties in litigation (even pro se litigants) are obligated to comply with court rules and procedures. The Court also noted that the officer had cited five cases in his appellate brief that did not exist, and that the some of the actual cases cited in his brief did not stand for the propositions stated in his brief. The Court stated that the officer's status as a "pro se" party does not excuse his careless reliance on AI, and that he was aware of the risks of using AI-generated research when this same issue was raised at the trial court and yet he still chose to use AI in this manner in his appellate brief. After holding oral argument on the motion to dismiss the appeal, the Appellate Court granted the pension board's motion and the officer's appeal was dismissed.

Appellate Court Interprets 50 Pages "Free of Charge" FOIA Provision

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA case filed by a requester who claimed the public body violated FOIA when it consolidated his six FOIA requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. Walters v. McHenry County Sheriff's Office.

A requester filed six FOIA requests on the same day with a county sheriff's office seeking Department of Corrections inspection reports for six different years (one year per request). The sheriff's office responded to the requests by providing 50 pages free of charge, and stating that the requester would have to pay 15 cents per page for the 113 remaining pages. The requester filed a lawsuit claiming that the sheriff's office violated FOIA by consolidating the six requests for purposes of applying the provision of FOIA requiring public bodies to release 50 pages free of charge, arguing that each of the six requests should have been treated separately. The sheriff's office filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that because the requester submitted the six requests together in one envelope on the same date, it was appropriate to aggregate and combine the requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. The trial court agreed with the sheriff's office, finding that the request was properly consolidated for purposes of applying FOIA's fee provision.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office but applied a different interpretation to the FOIA fee provision. The Appellate Court noted that the statute provides that “[n]o fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and white, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester.” The Appellate Court held that it was irrelevant whether the requester's FOIA requests were separate and distinct requests for different public records, and instead held that the requester's status as a single requester is what matters in applying this provision of FOIA, stating as follows:

Under the plain language of the statute, plaintiff—the “requester”—was entitled to “the first 50 pages *** requested” from defendant—the “public body”—free of charge. Id. Defendant provided 50 free pages to plaintiff and properly assessed fees for the additional 113 pages. Thus, plaintiff has not stated a valid claim against defendant for a FOIA violation, and the court was correct to dismiss his complaint.

In short, the Appellate Court held that a requester is entitled to the first 50 pages free of charge requested by that requester from that public body, and since the sheriff's office provided the first 50 pages at no charge, there was no FOIA violation and the requester's complaint was properly dismissed.

It is important to note that this appears to be the first time an Appellate Court has interpreted this FOIA fee provision in this manner, and that this is an unreported order not a published opinion. So, it remains to be seen whether other Illinois courts would rule in the same manner (i.e., that the 50 pages "free of charge" provision applies to the requester and not to each request).

Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's decision to deny an application for pension membership in Kooistra v. Board of Trustees of Sycamore Police Pension Fund.

A deputy chief in a municipal police department retired from that department and began receiving a retirement pension. Subsequently, he was hired as a patrol officer in a second municipal police department and submitted an application for membership in the second municipality's pension fund. His application was denied by the police pension board based on section 3-124.1(b) of the Police Pension Code, which states as follows:

(b) If a police officer who first becomes a member on or after January 1, 2019 is receiving pension payments (other than as provided in Section 3-109.3) and re-enters active service with any municipality that has established a pension fund under this Article, that police officer may continue to receive pension payments while he or she is in active service, but shall only participate in a defined contribution plan established by the municipality pursuant to Section 3-109.4 and may not establish creditable service in the pension fund established by that municipality or have his or her pension recomputed.” 40 ILCS 5/3-124.1(b)

The pension board determined that this statute precluded the officer from membership in the second municipality's pension fund because he was already receiving pension payments from the first municipality's pension fund; however, he could participate in a defined contribution plan. The officer appealed the pension board's decision to the circuit court which upheld the pension board's decision, and that ruling was then appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the language in Section 3-124.1(b) and determined that it applied to the officer who was drawing a pension from his former employer. The Court rejected the officer's argument that the statutory provision did not apply to him because he became a "member" of the first municipality's pension fund before January 1, 2019. Instead, the Court agreed with the pension board's interpretation of the statute that it applies to the officer because he became a member of the second municipality's police department after the statutory cutoff date. In the Court's view, that was the most logical interpretation because the officer "first" becomes a member of the second municipality's police department upon reentry into active service, which would allow him to continue to receive pension payments from the first municipality but preclude him from participating in the second municipality's pension fund. The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent of this section which was to prevent "double dipping" in two pension funds.

City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

In response to a FOIA request seeking an electronic copy of an incident report, a city denied the request and directed the requester to contact the city police records department to purchase the report at a cost of $5 for residents, or for $10 for non-residents. After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its 13th binding opinion of 2025, finding the City in violation of Section 6(a) of FOIA by improperly assessing a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report. PAC Op. 25-013.

The PAC relied upon the language of Section 6(a) of FOIA, which states that:

Except to the extent that the General Assembly expressly provides, statutory fees applicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to those records when furnished in an electronic format.” (Emphasis added.)

Although the city argued that the report fees were listed on its website, the PAC determiend that the city did not cite a FOIA provision or any other law that authorized the city to charge a special fee for disclosing electronic copies of incident reports. Even if the city had adopted an ordinance establishing those fees, the PAC determined that a municipal ordinance is not a statute. Here, because the Illinois legislature had not expressly authorized a statutory fee in excess of the cost of the recording medium for electronic copies of incident reports, and it was feasible for the city to disclose the report in the electronic format sought by the requester without the need to purchase a recording medium, the city was prohibited by FOIA from assessing the requester a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

A tree service business owned property in a village's general business district. The village informed the business owner that its use of the property was not permitted by the village's zoning ordinance and conducted an administrative hearing on the alleged violation. At the administrative hearing, the business owner argued it was not operating a landscape contractor business as the village claimed, and that its operations were compliant with the village's zoning ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing, tje administrative hearing officer found the business owner to be in violation of the zoning ordinance because (1) it was storing commercial vehicles and equipment on the property outside of an enclosed building, (2) the business operated a landscaping company which was not permitted in the general business district; and (3) commercial vehicles were parked on the property on an overnight basis in violation of the ordinance. The hearing officer issued a $150,000 fine against the business.

The business filed a complaint seeking administrative review of the village's decision that it was in violation of the zoning ordinance. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer's decision, and that decision was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the village's hearing officer's decision against the business, finding that (1) the business was operating a "contractor's shop" which was a permitted use in the business disrict; and (2) the parking of the businesses' commercial vehicles was allowed by the zoning ordinance, which allowed parking of commercial vehicles accessory to a business use. Because the Appellate Court found that the business was not in violation of the village's ordinances, it vacated the $150,000 fine. Tomax Tree Service, LLC v. Village of Westmont

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