The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an Illinois municipality's vehicle forfeiture program was not an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. O'Donnell v. City of Chicago. The City adopted an ordinance authorizing it to ...
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Municipal Minute

City's Vehicle Forfeiture Program Not an Unconstitutional Taking

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an Illinois municipality's vehicle forfeiture program was not an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. O'Donnell v. City of Chicago.

The City adopted an ordinance authorizing it to immobilize, tow, impound, and ultimately dispose of vehicles in enforcing its traffic code. After the City exercised its authority and disposed of two vehicles, the vehicle owners sued the City claiming that its forfeiture scheme was an unconstitutional taking under both the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. The district court dismissed the claims, which was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal, finding that the City's forfeiture program (which included provisions for notice and a hearing and included graduated penalties for multiple violations of the traffic code) was an exercise of the City's police power to enforce its traffic code, a punitive remedy that does not constitute a taking.

Grand Jury Subpoena in Possession of School District Not Exempt From FOIA

A requester sued a school district claiming it violated FOIA by improperly redacting certain names and other information in a federal grand jury subpoena received by the district. As part of its defense of the lawsuit, the school district submitted an affidavit signed by the school board president stating that the district relied on an opinion by the U.S Attorney’s Office stating that the grand jury subpoena was exempt from disclosure under several exemptions in the federal FOIA statute, and that disclosure of the subpoena would violate federal law and interfere with a criminal investigation. The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that it did not violate FOIA, but ordered the school district to disclose a copy of the subpoena with certain information unredacted.

On appeal, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court erred in determining that the school district properly redacted recipient names and other information contained in the subpoena in Edgar County Watchdogs v. Paris Union School District No. 95.

First, the Appellate Court held that the school district’s reliance on an opinion by the U.S. Attorney’s Office was misplaced, because the request was submitted to an Illinois public body under the Illinois FOIA statute, so federal FOIA’s statutory exemptions were inapplicable to this request.

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the school district’s argument that names in the subpoena were exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, because the school district did not demonstrate that any federal law or statute specifically prohibited disclosing those names.

Third, the Appellate Court determined that names of school district officials and employees in the subpoena "bear on" the duties of public employees, so disclosure would not cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

Next, the Appellate Court held that because the school district is not a law enforcement or correctional agency, had no investigatory role in the federal grand jury proceedings, and was not conducting an ongoing criminal investigation, and the school district did not demonstrate that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had a substantial interest in protecting names in the subpoena, the subpoena was not exempt under the law enforcement exemptions cited by the district.

Finally, because the school district’s asserted exemptions were not applicable, and the circuit court previously ordered the school district to release certain information that was originally redacted in its response to the FOIA request, the Appellate Court determined that the requester was a “prevailing” party in the FOIA lawsuit and could file a petition requesting the recovery of attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party.  

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Disclosing Termination Letter

The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office (PAC) issued a late binding opinion that did not make our year-end review of 2025 binding opinions, which we have summarized below.

In response to a FOIA request seeking a termination letter issued to former village clerk, a village entirely withheld the letter from disclosure pursuant to various exemptions under FOIA. Specifically, the village argued that several provisions of the Personnel Record Review Act (Act) prohibited the village from disclosing the letter in response to the FOIA request.

In its 16th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that the village improperly withheld the termination letter in response to the FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-016.

Although the Act permits an employee or their designated representative to review certain personnel records, the PAC determined that this right has no bearing on the availability of personnel records to third parties pursuant to FOIA. Even if the termination letter at issue was a record of disciplinary action taken against the former village clerk, the PAC determined that the Act did not require the Village to obtain the former village clerk’s consent before disclosing that letter to the FOIA requester. Instead, the Act merely required the village to give the former clerk notice of the FOIA request on or before the day that Village disclosed the letter in response to the FOIA request. The PAC also determined that the Act’s notice requirement to employees did not toll the village’s deadline to timely respond to the FOIA request. Therefore, the PAC concluded that the village did not demonstrate that the letter was exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA.

Because the termination letter at issue did not contain any personal information which, if disclosed, would cause the former clerk a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the letter itself directly bears on the public duties of the former village clerk, the PAC concluded that the letter was not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

Although the village argued that the termination letter included its decision-making rationale for terminating the former clerk, the PAC determined that the village never conducted an adjudicatory proceeding pertaining to the former clerk’s dismissal, so the Village did not demonstrate that the letter was exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Social Media & Local Government Book Recently Published by ABA

It's a new year and time for a new book for those who advise and work with local governments on social media legal issues. The ABA recently published my book "Social Media & Local Governments: Navigating the New Public Square," which is intended to be a practical and legal resource for local government lawyers, officials, and employees on the various legal issues that arise in local government use and regulation of social media. 

You can find the book here.