PAC Finds Village Board's Closed Session Violated OMA and more...

PAC Finds Village Board's Closed Session Violated OMA

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its third binding opinion for 2026 finding a village board in violation of the Open Meetings Act relating to a closed session. PAC Op. 26-003.

A sitting trustee on a village board submitted a complaint to the PAC claiming that the village board went into closed session to discuss "personnel issues" but instead discussed outstanding TIF loans. The village filed a response arguing that the board's closed session discussion fell under the "litigation exception" to the OMA, and that the mayor had mispoke in citing the personnel exception.

The PAC reviewed the village's response, the meeting minutes, and the recording of the closed session. First, the PAC noted that the closed session discussion did not pertain to personnel issues. Further, the PAC stated that even if the board had discussed personnel issues in closed session, a generic reference to "personnel" is not adequate to identify a specific OMA exception. The PAC also found that the board failed to record the board's public vote on the motion in the meeting minutes. As a result, the PAC determined that the village board violated the OMA by not publicly disclosing and recording into the minutes the specific exception authorizing the closed session.

The PAC also rejected the village's argument that the litigation exception applied because litigation was an option for the village in dealing with the oustanding TIF loans. First, the PAC found that the board did not cite to that exception in open session or make the necessary finding in closed session as to why litigation was probable or imminent. Second, the PAC noted that litigation was "merely a distant possibility," which was not sufficient to fall under the probable or imminent litigation exception to the OMA.

The PAC ordered the village board to publicly release its verbatim recording of the meeting as a remedy to the OMA violation.

Illinois Bill Proposes Regulations for E-Bikes, E-Scooters, and Similar Devices

After Public Act 103-899 was signed into law in August 2024 (regulating low-speed electric bikes), some Illinois local governments adopted a patchwork of regulations governing the operation of low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters in their communities. In an effort to promote statewide uniformity, the Illinois General Assembly is considering Senate Bill 3336, which, if passed in both houses, would enact sweeping changes to the authority and scope of local government regulations for these and other devices and vehicles.

This post analyzes some of most important changes proposed by the bill.

Electric Micromobility Devices (EMDs)

First, SB 3336 would repeal Section 11-1518 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code), and replace it with a new section regulating “electric micromobility devices.” The bill broadly defines an electric micromobility device (EMD) to mean a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation and operated at speeds up to 28 miles per hour (including low and high-speed electric scooters, electric skateboards, and electric unicycles).

If passed, SB 3336 would generally permit people at least 16 years of age to operate an EMD on any highway, roadway, or bicycle lane/path in Illinois in a manner that does not impede vehicular traffic—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, interstate highways, or on highways with a posted speed limit exceeding 35 mph (unless it has a designated bike lane). For EMD’s operating in excess of 28 miles per hour, SB 3336 would prohibit their operation on any public highway, bike path, or bike lane, regardless of speed limit. The bill expressly exempts operators of EMD’s from obtaining a drivers license (or permit), registration, certificate of title, or liability insurance. SB 3336 would also authorize local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound an EMD operated in violation of the Code, and release the EMD upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impoundment. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating EMDs in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Motor Driven Cycles

Second, SB 3336 creates a new section regulating the operation of “motor driven cycles,” which are broadly defined to include (1) every motorcycle, moped, and every motor scooter with an internal combustion engine of less than 150 cubic centimeter piston displacement, (2) an electric motor with a nominal power rating of greater than 750 watts but less than or equal to 8,000 watts, (3) or motorized pedalcycles and every electric bicycle or gas-powered bicycle that is not a low-speed electric bicycle or low-speed gas bicycle.

If passed, SB 3336 would generally allow people possessing a drivers license (or an instruction permit in certain circumstances) to operate a motor driven cycle on public highways, streets, and roadways—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, bike paths, bike lanes, shared-use paths, off-road bike trails, natural surface trails designated for bike use, or any other bike-specific facility established by State or local law. In contrast to EMD’s, operators of motor driven cycles must have a drivers license (or permit), liability insurance, and must generally acquire a certificate of title. Similar to EMD restrictions, SB 3336 also authorizes local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound motor driven cycles operated in violation of the Code, and release them upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impounding. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating motor driven cycles in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Low-Speed Electric Bicycles (E-Bikes and Gas-Bikes)

SB 3336 also proposes various changes to the Code provisions regarding low-speed electric bicycle (e-bikes) and low-speed gas bicycle regulations (gas-bikes). Currently, the Code has no minimum age requirement to operate Class 1 and 2 e-bikes. SB 3336, if passed, would require operators of Class 1 and 2 e-bikes to be at least 15 years old. Currently, the Code authorizes local governments to prohibit the operation of e-bikes on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would take that power away from local governments, and instead authorize the operation of e-bikes on any bike path unless “the State agency with jurisdiction” prohibits using e-bikes, or a specific class of e-bike, on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would also expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating e-bikes or gas bikes in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Toy Vehicles

SB 3336 also proposes a new definition for “toy vehicle,” which includes any battery powered ride-on toy that (i) is designed to not exceed 10 miles per hour, (ii) includes any number of wheels or handlebars or a steering wheel, and a seat or platform, and (iii) is designed for children under 8 years of age, including products like "Razor," "Power Wheels," and similar products.

If passed, SB 3336 would authorize the operation of toy vehicles on local government property, unless the local government adopts an ordinance or resolution specifically prohibiting their use. Toy vehicles would also be prohibited from operating on sidewalks and paths designated for bicycles. The bill, if passed, would preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating toy vehicles in a manner less restrictive than the Code.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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DOJ Extends Title II ADA Web Content Accessibility Compliance Deadlines

On April 20, 2026, the DOJ published an interim final rule (link here) to extend the compliance deadlines under the new Title II Americans with Disabilities Act Rule that set technical standards requiring state and local government web content and mobile apps to meet the technical standards of Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Version 2.1, Level AA.

The Rule previously required state and local governments with a population of 50,000 or more to comply with the accessibility guidelines by April 24, 2026. State and local governments with a population of less than 50,000, and any special district governments, were required to comply by April 26, 2027.

The DOJ’s new interim final rule extends the deadline for state and local governments to comply with the new Rule by at least a year, as follows:

State and Local Government Size	New Compliance Date
0 to 49,999 persons	April 26, 2028
Special district governments	April 26, 2028
50,000 or more persons	April 26, 2027

Post Authored by Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

Supreme Court Declines to Hear AI Copyright Case

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal in an Artificial Intelligence (AI)/copyright case. Thaler v. Perlmutter. You can read the court of appeals decision here.

A Missouri artist had applied for a copyright registration for visual art he created through the use of AI technology. The U.S. Copyright Office rejected his application because the work was not created by "human authorship" as required to register a copyright. He sued, and both the district court and court of appeals upheld the Copyright Office's denial of his application. He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear his appeal, meaning that the Copyright Office's rejection of his application for a copyright for the AI work stands.

This wasn't the first time the Copyright Office rejected registration applications by artists for work generated by AI based on the lack of "human authorship" in the work. This case had been followed by artists, musicians, photographers, and other creators who have used AI in their creative works and were hoping for a different outcome in court. For now, at least, work created by AI is not copyright eligible.

Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Preventing Enforcement of Law That Limits “Drag Story Hour” and Similar Events

In 2023, the Montana state legislature passed a bill (Bill) prohibiting any school or library that receives state funding from allowing any “sexually oriented performance or drag story hour” on their property. The Bill includes significant criminal and civil penalties for both performers and institutions hosting these events. Just months after the Bill passed, a group of individuals, organizations, and businesses (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit claiming the Bill violates the First Amendment by restricting protected speech based on content. The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction limiting the state's enforcement of the Bill during the lawsuit. The state appealed the court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Imperial Sovereign Court of the State of Montana, et al. v. Knudsen, et al.

After determining that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bill, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutional claims raised in the case. In order to determine the proper framework to evaluate the First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Bill “regulates purely expressive activity or expressive conduct,” and whether the regulations are content-based or content-neutral.

To start, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Bill was not passed to regulate “obscenity,” which is a narrow category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the Bill was purportedly enacted to limit children’s exposure to “indecent speech.” The Ninth Circuit noted that state legislative authority to regulate for the protection of minors must be considered against the long history of the First Amendment, which applies to protect “sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene.”

Drag Story Hour

The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were likely to establish that the Bill’s restriction on drag storytelling events is subject to strict scrutiny, because the restriction impacts purely expressive activity and regulates based on content. First, the Court noted that these performances (involving reading out loud while performing a drag persona) constitute expressive activity, likening drag story hours to theatrical plays. Second, the Court asserted three reasons to support their determination that the restriction was content-based: the Bill’s restriction (1) applies only to people reading a particular type of content, (2) prohibits only certain speakers from reading the book out loud or conveying a message, and (3) draws a line between prohibited and permitted speakers based on the content of their expression. The Court determined that these elements of the Bill were a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.

Using the strict scrutiny framework, the Court next determined that the restriction on drag story hour events was not narrowly tailored to address the State’s expressed interest in preventing the exposure of minors to “indecent speech.” The Court found that the plain language of the Bill would impact speech activity widely accepted as appropriate under historic and contemporary standards. The Court noted that the Bill’s definition of “drag queen” and “drag king,” which includes the adoption of a “flamboyant or parodic male and female personas” using costumes and makeup, could be applied to include popular, well-received characters from G-rated children’s movies. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the Bill was not tailored to limit children’s exposure to sexualized content and was overinclusive in the content it purports to regulate. The Court also determined that the provision was not narrowly tailored because it disregards minors’ own speech rights and completely overrides parental authority to determine appropriate content for their children. Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction award, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the restriction on drag story hours violated the First Amendment.

Sexually Oriented Performances

In addressing the Bill’s prohibition on “sexually oriented performances” in schools and libraries, the Ninth Circuit again evaluated whether the restriction limits purely expressive activity based on content. The Court found that the performances are purely expressive and, when viewed as a whole, constitute protected speech. The Court noted that, in the case of the statutory restriction on “sexually oriented performances,” the legislature limited speech based on its effect on young viewers. The Court characterized this limitation as “the essence of a content-based speech restriction.”

After determining that the restriction on sexually oriented performances was content-based, the Ninth Circuit found that it was not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s interest in protecting minors. The Court noted that the legislature’s use of the phrase "sexually oriented” was vague and ambiguous, leaving schools and libraries to guess which performances and events would be subject to the Bill’s prohibitions. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the restriction on speech was not plausibly linked to its impact on children, given that several of the Bill’s restrictions would apply to limit performances in schools and libraries even when children are not present. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction that limited state enforcement of the Bill while the case proceeded in court.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung and Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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