Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill and more...

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill. Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot.

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed.

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows:

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act.

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct.

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

A new Illinois law governing who can use electric bikes and scooters, how fast they go, and where they can be used will go into effect next year. Last week, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed Senate Bill 3484 (now P.A. 104-0854) creating new statewide standards for “micromobility” devices that include age restrictions, speed limits, and locations where they can operate. The bill takes effect on January 1, 2027.

According to the bill, “electric micromobility devices” are a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation that operate at speeds up to 28 miles per hour. This includes electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters.

Electric and gas bicycles strong enough to exceed the state’s existing “low-speed” thresholds fall into a category of regulations called “motor driven cycles.” Electric bikes fall into this category if they either have electric motors rated between 750 and 8,000 watts or can operate at speeds greater than 28 miles per hour.

These vehicles will be regulated similarly to motorcycles if owners of these vehicles purchased new on or after January 1, 2027, will be required to have a driver’s license, insurance, an ownership title, and register the vehicle with the state. According to the bill, the Secretary of State may issue an instruction permit to a person who is 16 or 17 years old that entitles the holder to drive on the highways during daylight under direct supervision of a licensed motor driven cycle operator who is at least 21 and has a year of driving experience.

“Motor driven cycles” can operate on any public highway, street, or roadway, but may not be used on any sidewalk, bicycle lane, bicycle path, shared-use path, off-road bicycle trail, or natural surface trail designated for bicycle use.

“Low-speed” electric bicycles are already regulated by the state, but the law creates new categories that govern how old a person must be to drive them. Drivers must be 15 years old to operate a Class 1 pedal-assist bicycle that’s limited to 20 miles per hour, and a Class 2 motor-powered bike that doesn’t have to be pedaled. However, riders must be 16 years old to operate a Class 3 pedal-assist bike that can travel up to 28 miles per hour.

All low-speed electric bicycles can be used on streets, bikes, lanes, paths, and trails, but not sidewalks.

The new regulations cap “electric micromobility devices” such as electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters at 28 miles per hour. Devices capable of exceeding that speed are barred outright from public roads, bike lanes, and bike paths, regardless of the posted speed limit. Riders may operate qualifying devices on any path, bike lane, roads with speed limits up to 35 miles per hour, or roads with higher speed limits if there is a bike lane. A person may not operate one of these devices unless they are 16 years of age or older.

Battery powered ride-on toys that are designed for children under 8-years-old would be unregulated aside from a stipulation they must stay on sidewalks and paths.

Users who violate the regulations could pay fines and have their devices confiscated and impounded by the police. They are also subject to other existing traffic laws and penalties.

Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records

In its 9th binding opinion for 2026, the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found in favor of a public body in a FOIA appeal involving a request for storm sewer infrastructure maps and records. PAC Op. 26-009.

A requester submitted a request to a city water department asking for sewer and flood control maps, GIS mapping data, engineering schematics, and other maps detailing the exact locations of all surface water drainage infrastructure for a specified area in the city. The city denied the request, citing to section 7(1)(x) of FOIA which exempts the following from disclosure:

Maps and other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, storage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or by the Illinois Power Agency.

The PAC agreed with the city that the FOIA exemption applied to the requested records, finding that the "plain language of section 7(1)(x) exempts, among other things, maps and other records regarding the location of gathering facilities owned by a utility." The PAC determined that the city's water department operated as a "utility" and that the infrastructure operated by the city that was the subject of the request qualified as "facilities" under the cited FOIA exemption. The PAC rejected the requester's argument that the city was required to demonstrate how release of the records would affect the security of the city's utility system, finding that records that reveal "the location" of utility facilities was enough to trigger the exemption without having to show a security concern, stating as follows:

Because section 7(1)(x) is worded disjunctively, however, it provides two independent bases for claiming the exemption: (1) the requested records regard the location of facilities owned by a utility or (2) the requested records regard the security of facilities owned by a utility.

In sum, the PAC determined that the requested records (consisting of atlases-detailed maps showing the location of sewers, storm mains, access points, and various other details of the city's water infrastructure and GIS mapping data detailing the location of stormwater gathering facilities) fall squarely within the types of records exempt under section 7(1)(x). As a result, the city did not violate FOIA in denying the request in its entirety.

Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA lawsuit, finding the appeal frivolous in Tidwell v. Illinois Department of Corrections.

A requester submitted a request to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) seeking the names of all medical personnel. IDOC denied the request, citing to a FOIA exemption that expressly exempts from release records requested by persons committed to the DOC or a county jail that include staff members' personnel files, staff rosters, or other staffing assignment information. The requester filed a lawsuit against IDOC. The circuit court dismissed his lawsuit, ruling in favor of IDOC. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of his lawsuit, finding that his appeal of the circuit court's decision was frivolous because he was aware of the specific exemption that prevented the disclosure of the information he requested.

Municipal Minute