Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam and more...

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast released Episode 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam. In this episode, the American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 11th Annual “Bar Exam” Planning Law Session. Recorded live at Goodwin’s in Chicago, this realistic, simulated law school experience tests planners and land use professionals on the latest legal precedents in wind energy, annexation, and First Amendment protections. As is tradition, all participants passed the bar, and teams competed for the prestigious (and five-foot-tall) Ancel Glink Cup. In this episode, Ancel Glink’s Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Tyler Smith are joined by special guest Phil Green, a Local Gov 250 Government Champion, who undergoes a high-tech “firmware update” to become the session’s first AI-powered planning law assistant.

In This Episode

§ [00:00] The Roll Call: Host Dan Bolin calls the meeting to order with professors Megan Mack and Tyler Smith, plus local government champion Phil Green.

§ [05:00] Round 1: Democracy at the Doorstep: Phil discusses his recognition as a Local Gov 250 Champion and his work on “democracy at the doorstep” in Hoffman Estates.

§ [11:30] Case 1.1 - Wind Farm Bans: A look at Hickory Wind LLC v. Village of Cedar Point, exploring why outright bans on lawful land uses exceed non-home rule authority.

§ [19:00] Case 1.2 - Zoning Finality: In Chosen Consulting LLC v. Town Council of Highland, we learn why ADA and discrimination claims do not bypass the requirement for a final zoning decision.

§ [22:30] Case 1.3 - Cross-Examination Rights: A resort project in Galena highlights the importance of maintaining a record when residents forfeit their right to cross-examine witnesses.

§ [26:30] Round 2: The Road to Houston: Phil shares takeaways from serving as the Education Chair for NPC26 in Detroit and teases a “Moon Joy” theme for NPC27 in Houston.

§ [31:45] Case 2.1 - Forceful Annexation: We review a 4.7% perimeter gap in Husky Transportation v. Village of Barrington Hills to define the “wholly bounded” standard.

§ [35:45] Case 2.2 - First Amendment Retaliation: The saga of the Minocqua Brewing Co. demonstrates that permit denials are not retaliatory if they would have occurred regardless of protected speech.

§ [39:15] Case 2.3 - The Hamburger UFOs: A whimsical mural case from Kansas tests “intermediate scrutiny” and whether cities can prove that burger art is more distracting than flower art.

§ [42:00] The Future of Planning Law: Megan and Tyler discuss the responsible use of AI in legal practice and how municipalities are responding to data center controversies involving power and water consumption.

§ [46:15] The Reveal of A.I. CPU: Phil Green manifests as the A.I. CPU, an assistant that is 100% confident, 60% accurate, and requires massive amounts of “liquid cooling” to function.

§ [48:00] Round 3: AI-Assisted Answers: The A.I. CPU helps navigate cases on warrantless rental inspections, daily fine calculations, and why missing scaffolding is not a legal defense for safety hazards.

§ [1:02:30] Crowning the Champions: We announce the winners of the 2026 Bar Exam and award the shiny gold Ancel Glink Cup to the “Transit Masters.”

Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

After a police department failed to respond to a news agency's FOIA request, the requester filed a lawsuit. Although the department produced its responsive records during the litigation, the requester filed a petition for civil penalties against the department pursuant to Section 11(j) of FOIA, which states that:

If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence. 5 ILCS 140/11(j).

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that the department had willfully and intentionally violated FOIA because it had knowledge of FOIA’s response requirements and did not to demonstrate a good reason for non-compliance with those requirements. However, relying on prior Illinois cases that required a requester to demonstrate both (1) a willful and intentional violation of FOIA, and (2) that the FOIA violation was deliberate, by design, and done with a dishonest purpose, the circuit court ruled that the requester was not entitled to civil penalties, because the requester did not prove that the department had a dishonest purpose when violating FOIA.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court (First District) reversed the circuit court’s denial of civil penalties, and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine appropriate civil penalties. Lucy Parsons Labs v. Chicago Police Department. The Appellate Court determined that the “or otherwise acted in bad faith” language in Section 11(j) is a catch-all category of possible bad faith actions that a public body can take in violation of FOIA. In other words, the examples of bad faith conduct included in Section 11(j) of FOIA—willful and intentional noncompliance—is an illustrative example of bad faith conduct rather than an exhaustive list. The Appellate Court reasoned that interpreting Section 11(j) of FOIA to require demonstrating that a public body “willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA” supplants the catchall term, and replaces it with the conjunctive “and,” which imposes a higher standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith non-compliance with FOIA, and eliminates the possibility that a “willful and intentional” violation of FOIA could, by itself, warrant civil penalties. In this case, because the circuit court found that the department intentionally and willfully violated FOIA, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court’s order finding that the requester had not met its burden of proof for the imposition of civil penalties against the department was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a municipality in a case brought by a property owner challenging the municipality's zoning decisions relating to the owner's commercial uses of property zoned in a Conservation zoning district. Deepe v. Village of Swansea Planning & Zoning Board.

The owner of two parcels of property applied for a zoning compliance certificate and construction permit to operate a commercial business on land zoned in the Conservation district. Over several years, the owner applied for and received permits and permission from the municipality to operate his business. After neighbors complained about the operation of the lawncare and storage businesses on the two parcels, the municipality notified the owner that his uses were nonconforming and he needed to bring his operations into compliance with the zoning regulations. The owner appealed the order to the zoning board, which ruled in favor of the municipality. He then appealed to the circuit court, which ruled in favor of the owner with respect to one of the parcels, finding that the municipality was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its regulations. However, the court found in favor of the municipality with respect to the second parcel. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the owner on his equitable estoppel claim. The Court first determined that the two parcels were zoned in the Conservation district, and the owner never applied for a rezoning to a more appropriate district. Second, the owner knew and even acknowledged that the Conservation district did not allow a storage business so he could not rely on any acquiescence by the municipality. Third, the Court acknowledged that while the municipality could have been more forceful in its enforcement, "slow enforcement" would not support an estoppel claim. In sum, the Court found in favor of the municipality, holding that the owner could not establish an "equitable estoppel" claim for its use of either parcel.

There was a dissenting opinion that would have ruled in favor of the property owner on his equitable estoppel claims based on the actions of municipal officials and employees over the years with respect to the owner's uses.

Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks

In Solano v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a home rule municipality's authority to use its administrative adjudication hearing system and fine drivers of overweight trucks in an amount in excess of $250.00. First, the Court acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court in Cammacho v. City of Joliet had previously held that home rule governments could use administrative hearings to adjudicate moving offenses and reportable violations. Second, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that section 11-208.3 of the Illinois Vehicle Code restricts municipalities from imposing a fine of more than $250.00 for certain standing, parking, and other violations, finding that overweight trucks were not listed in the category of offenses identified in that section of the Code. As a result, the Court upheld the municipality's issuance of the fine against Solano.

Abandonment Statute Does Not Require Proof of Delivery or Receipt of Notice

An Illinois Appellate Court recently interpreted the abandonment procedures of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code), holding that a municipality does not have to prove actual delivery or receipt of notice to all parties with a record interest in order to obtain a judicial deed under section 11-31-1 of the Code. Village of Downers Grove v. Beckham.

A municipality filed a petition with the court under section 11-31-1 of the Code to request that the court declare a property abandoned and issue a judicial deed to the property as well as an order of demolition. The municipality argued that the property was in disrepair and unfit for occupancy, as well as dangerous and unsafe. The petition indicated that notices were sent by mail to all named defendants advising them of the court action. The owner of record executed a waiver of rights to challenge the petition. However, another defendant (Lakeview) with a security interest in the property objected to the petition based on notice deficiencies. After the municipality amended its petition and served notice by certified mail, Lakeview again objected to the petition on notice grounds. The circuit court ultimately granted the municipality's petition and issued a judicial deed for the property.

Lakeview appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in issuing the judicial deed because the municipality failed to establish that notice was actually delivered to or received by all interested parties. The municipality argued that the statute does not require proof of delivery, and the Appellate Court agreed, holding that section 11-31-1(d) of the Code does not condition the notice's effectiveness on actual delivery or receipt. Instead, the Code only requires the municipality to send the notice in the required manner - i.e., by certified or registered mail. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's issuance of the judicial deed.

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