11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional and more...

11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional

In Scott v. City of Daytona Beach, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down several provisions of a city ordinance that restricted panhandling.

Daytona Beach, Florida, enacted Ordinance No. 19-27 in 2019. The ordinance banned “aggressive panhandling” throughout the city, banned traditional panhandling in numerous locations, and restricted certain methods of panhandling.

Four men who regularly panhandled in Daytona Beach challenged the ordinance both facially and as applied to them, arguing it violated their First Amendment free-speech rights. After conducting a lengthy standing analysis for each plaintiff and each challenged provision, the court addressed the merits of the constitutional claims.

First, relying on existing precedent, the Court reaffirmed that panhandling is protected speech under the First Amendment. The Court next determined that the challenged provisions were “content-based” rather than “content-neutral” regulations, meaning that the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of constitutional review, requiring a compelling government interest pursued through the least speech-restrictive means.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the city argued that the ordinance was necessary to advance the compelling government interests of protecting public health and promoting traffic safety. While the Court acknowledged that both can be compelling government interests, it concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The Court also noted that the city could pursue both interests through less speech-restrictive means, including the enforcement of existing laws such as disorderly conduct or trespassing.

As a result, the Court struck down those portions of the ordinance that were found unconstitutional. The Court also upheld an award of $80,000 in damages to the plaintiffs.

Note that this decision covers the 11th Circuit and not the 7th Circuit in which Illinois is located. However, the content-based versus content-neutral analysis comes from U.S. Supreme Court precedent that applies to all states.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando, Ancel Glink

Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

A candidate applied for a probationary police officer position with a city police department. As part of the application process, the city conducted a background investigation that found two police reports that included allegations of assault and stalking by the candidate against two women. After investigating the incidents and interviewing the candidate, the city removed the candidate from the eligibility list for dishonesty during the interview and past criminal conduct. The candidate challenged his disqualification with the city's police board which upheld the decision. He then filed an appeal with the circuit court which also upheld the city's disqualification.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the candidate argued that the disqualification was "unjust" because he had never been arrested. He also claimed the allegations made by the two women were false. Finally, he claimed the city violated his due process rights. The city defended its disqualification decision, arguing that they had sufficient evidence to dispute his claims, including records of two prior arrests.

First, the Appellate Court reviewed the bases relied upon by the city for its disqualification decision (impersonation of a police officer, conduct indicating violent tendencies, and false statements during the application process) and determined that the city had ample evidence to support its decision to disqualify the candidate from the eligibility list for the position of probationary police officer.

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the candidate's claim that his due process rights were violated, finding that he received written notice of his disqualification, he took full advantage of the opportunity to challenge his disqualification through a written appeal to the police board, and that there is no legal requirement that disqualified applicants are entitled to an in-person hearing to confront witnesses. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the city's decision to disqualify him from the police officer position. Navarro-Angulo v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al.

Court Rules Against Journalists in Lawsuit Against Police Officers for Injuries Sustained at a Protest

In Schukar, et al. v. Kenosha County, et al., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s decision in favor of police officers in a First and Fourth Amendment case brought by photojournalists relating to a protest incident.

On August 25, 2020, two photojournalists were documenting a protest at the Kenosha County Courthouse. The protest was sparked by the shooting of a 29-year-old Black male by a City of Kenosha police officer. During the protest, both protestors and police officers launched objects at one another, including the officers’ launching of foam batons that hit and injured the journalists. Shortly after the incident, the journalists filed a lawsuit against two police officers who were at the protest. They claimed the officers intentionally struck them in retaliation for engaging in the First Amendment protected activity of protesting and used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the journalists, who appealed the district court’s ruling.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the police officers. As to the journalists' First Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found there was no evidence that either officer intentionally targeted the journalists for engaging in their First Amendment right to protest. The Court found that the officers’ use-of-force reports (which failed to accurately state the total number of rounds deployed during the protest) were not enough to show that the officers intentionally targeted the photojournalists.

As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit determined that it was not "clearly established" by case law whether an officer’s intentional deployment of less-than-lethal munitions that hit unintended targets during a protest constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the journalists could not defeat the officers' claims of qualified immunity.

Authored by Rachel Stempler, Ancel Glink

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 8th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA for not responding to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 26-008.

A requester submitted a FOIA request for copies of agendas for all meetings of the village for a 4 month period. He followed up with a second FOIA request seeking records pertaining to mold remediation at village hall and asking the village to respond to several questions. Ten days after he submitted his requests, he filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village failed to respond to either FOIA request. After the PAC reached out to the village for a response and did not hear from the village, it issued a binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA requests.

Although there is nothing new in this opinion regarding a public body's obligation to respond to FOIA, the PAC did include the following footnote in its opinion noting that the village had no obligation to answer the questions posed by the requester in his second FOIA request (see below):

13. To the extent that Mr. Kilbanerei's request asked questions concerning the location of Village documents and any plans to relocate Village documents, FOIA does not require the Village to answer those questions. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ("The Act does not compel the agency to provide answers to questions posed by the inquirer.").

Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

An Illinois Appellate Court held that a board of fire and police commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear disciplinary charges against a police officer because the hearing was not held within 30 days of the filing of the charges. Harris v. City of Madison Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.

A city police chief filed written disciplinary charges with the city's board of fire and police commission seeking a police officer's removal from the police department. The charges alleged that the officer fraudulently documented time spent patrolling. The board commenced a hearing but heard no testimony, received no evidence, did not render a decision, and instead continued the matter. The officer filed a lawsuit against the board claiming that because the board failed to conduct a hearing within the 30 day time frame required by state statute, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the pending disciplinary charges. After the circuit court denied the city's motion to dismiss because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing within the statutory timeframe, the police chief filed a second set of disciplinary charges with the board. The officer then filed a motion with the circuit court seeking an injunction to stop the board from conducting a hearing, arguing that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not conduct the original hearing within the statutory timeframe. The circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding the second set of disciplinary charges to be a new filing that could proceed to hearing.

The officer appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court cited to section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code that requires a board of fire and police commission to conduct a hearing on written charges "within 30 days of the filing" of the charges with the board. The Appellate Court found that the original disciplinary charges were never voluntarily dismissed by the city nor was the original proceeding terminated by the board (it was continued by the board). As a result, the Court held that the second set of charges (which were identical to the first) did not "restart" the statutory 30 day period for commencing a hearing, so the board had no jurisdiction to proceed on the disciplinary charges against the officer.

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