Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down and more...

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory.

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

The First District Appellate Court overturned a trial court's denial of civil penalties in a FOIA case challenging a police department's response to a news media's FOIA requests. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

NBC filed FOIA requests with a police department seeking surveillance video, incident reports, witness statements, and other records relating to a hit-and-run crash, as well as emails to and from two police officers relating to the crash. The police department responded by referring the requester to its records inquiry section for the crash reports and by denying the request for body-work camera footage. The response also denied other requested records claiming they were exempt because there was an ongoing criminal investigation. The police department sent an extension notice regarding the request for emails, but later denied that request citing to the same ongoing criminal investigation exemption.

NBC filed a lawsuit against the police department, claiming it violated FOIA. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department relating to certain counts in the complaint, including finding that the police department completed a reasonable search and that certain responsive records had been destroyed pursuant to the department's records retention policy. However, the court ruled against the department regarding its withholding of certain records in their entirety. The court also found that the department "willfully and intentionally violated FOIA" by not producing the requested records. The department subsequently produced the requested records, and NBC then filed a motion seeking its attorneys fees and an award of civil penalties against the department. The court granted NBC's request for attorneys fees. However, the court denied NBC's request for civil penalties, applying a Second District Appellate Court ruling that would require NBC to show that the department "willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith" (emphasis added) failed to comply with FOIA. In this case, the trial court found there was no evidence that the department acted with a "dishonest purpose" by withholding the records.

NBC appealed, arguing that FOIA does not require a showing of bad faith to justify the imposition of civil penalties if the public body is shown to have willfully and intentionally violated FOIA. The Appellate Court agreed with NBC, stating as follows:

We agree with this court’s decisions in Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that section 11(j) does not require separate showings that the public body both “willfully and intentionally” violated FOIA and did so “in bad faith,” or with a “dishonest purpose.” This analysis is true to the language of section 11(j), which allows for the imposition of civil penalties when “a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS 140/11(j). We agree with Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that this court’s decision in Williams “failed to honor the disjunctive ‘or’” in section 11(j), and in doing so created a more demanding standard for the imposition of civil penalties than contemplated by the text of the statute. [citations omitted] Thus, we decline to follow Williams or Thomas.

Applying its interpretation of section 11(j) of FOIA, the First District Appellate Court found that the department's "deliberate and by design" conduct in denying the FOIA request was enough to justify the imposition of civil penalties. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the case back to the trial court to make a determination on an appropriate civil penalty against the police department.

This decision means that the First and Second District Appellate Courts have taken a different position on the type of conduct by a public body that justifies the imposition of civil penalties for a FOIA violation.

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

Ancel Glink released Episode 109 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Quorum Forum Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid.

This year marks 100 years since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. In this episode, we share a recorded presentation from Ancel Glink's David Silverman, FAICP, and ZoneCo's Sean Suder, as a sneak preview of their upcoming live plenary session at the APA-IL State Conference on September 30, 2026!

Episode Highlights

The Public Safety Roots of Zoning: Why early 20th-century industrial chaos, street accidents involving children, noise, and pollution prompted the Supreme Court to step in

The Dual Legacy: How the "intensity of use" rules established in 1926 successfully protected neighborhoods but fostered exclusionary development patterns

Modern Prescriptions: A look at statewide zoning challenges, local preemption, and the "BUILD" legislative strategies impacting local authority

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill. Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot.

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed.

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows:

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act.

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct.

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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