Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank and more...

Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank

An Illinois Appellate Court held that a pension board erred in awarding a line-of-duty disability pension based on a firefighter's salary rather than a lieutenant's salary in Schneider v. Elgin Firefighters' Pension Fund.

A firefighter employed by a city's fire department injured his back while responding to a call. He was unable to return to duty and applied for a disability pension. During the time between his injury and the pension board hearing, the city had promoted him from the rank of firefighter to lieutenant. The pension board awarded him a pension based on a firefighter's salary and he appealed to the circuit court, arguing that his pension should have been based on a lieutenant's salary. The circuit court upheld the pension board's decision. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the pension board argued that it determined the pension award based on the firefighter having been injured while serving as a firefighter, having received workers' compensation benefits based on his firefighter salary, having never worked or qualified for work as a lieutenant, and having never contributed to the pension fund at the lieutenant rank. As a result, the board had concluded that the firefighter rank was the rank "held" at the time he was removed from payroll for purposes of determining his pensionable salary.

The firefighter argued that section 4-110 of the Pension Coe requires a line-of-duty disability pension to be calculated based on the "monthly salary attached to the rank held...at the date [the firefighter] is removed from the municipality's fire department payroll" and that since he was a sworn lieutenant at the time he was removed from the fire department's payroll, his pension should be based on that rank.

The Appellate Court agreed with the firefighter, finding that he had been promoted to lieutenant before he was removed from the fire department's payroll and, as a result, he should have been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension based on the lieutenant salary since that is the rank he held on the payroll-removal date.

Dual Circulation Prohibition Not Apply to Nonpartisan School Board Candidates

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a board of election commissioners that school board candidates did not violate the Election Code's prohibition on dual circulation in collecting signatures for an election involving non-partisan candidates. Sanchez v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

Objections were filed to the nominating petitions submitted by certain candidates running for elected school board positions in the upcoming November 2026 election. The objections claimed that the candidates had violated the "dual circulation" prohibition of the Election Code because circulators who collected signatures for the candidates had also circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election in March of 2026. The objection was heard by the board of election commissioners which denied the objections. The objectors appealed to the circuit court which upheld the board's decision and the case made its way to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first examined the relevant statute, which states as follows:

[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election. 10 ILCS 5/10- 4.

The candidates argued that the dual circulation prohibition of this statute applies only to candidates of political parties and independents, but does not apply to nonpartisan candidates. Because the school board candidates were nonpartisan candidates, the candidates argued that the statute did not bar circulators who had previously circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election. The Appellate Court agreed, finding that the clear language of the statute only applied to partisan and independent elections and the school board election was, by statute, nonpartisan. As a result, the petitions circulated by the challenged circulators were proper and the candidates were not barred from running for office.

Court Finds in Favor of School District in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Involving Student-Athlete

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a ruling in favor of a school district in a lawsuit relating to a student-athlete’s death, holding that government tort immunity barred the family’s claims because the family could not show the district’s inaction caused the student’s death. (Falconer v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 (5th Dist.).

A student and football player collapsed during a preseason conditioning program in the school’s weight room. One of the coaches immediately called 911, and another coach checked his vital signs and found a “radial pulse.” Medical assistants from the school’s on-site health clinic and responding paramedics all confirmed that the student had a detectable pulse and respiration. Because he had a pulse and was breathing, no one administered a shock or performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The student was transported to the hospital, where he lost his pulse; CPR there was unsuccessful, and he died. An autopsy later revealed an undiagnosed heart condition.

The student’s mother sued the East St. Louis School District for negligence and willful and wanton conduct, arguing that school staff should have used the automated external defibrillator device in the weight room and performed CPR regardless of the pulse readings. She also argued that the school district violated Illinois’s AED Act and Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act by failing to properly staff and prepare for a medical emergency.

The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the district had immunity under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court agreed. The court found the district could not be held liable because its staff’s actions were not the actual or legal cause of the student's death; he was breathing and had a pulse throughout the time he was in the district’s care, and only stopped breathing and lost his pulse after he arrived at the hospital, under EMT and hospital staff supervision. The court also rejected the argument that the more specific AED Act and Facility Preparedness Act should override the Tort Immunity Act’s protections. Finally, the court held that several sections of the Tort Immunity Act independently shielded the district from liability, since staffing and the decisions in response to the emergency were purely discretionary in nature rather than mandated duties.

Post Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

A village police officer towed a vehicle that had five parking citations. The following day, an individual went to the police department and offered to pay $22 to the village, which he claimed satisfied the debt, and demanded the car be returned. The village refused to release the vehicle. Subsequently, the individual filed a lawsuit against the village alleging unjust enrichment on the village's part in keeping the vehicle, among other claims. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the individual had no standing to sue the village because he was not the owner of the vehicle and had no legal interest to sue the village for its return.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that he had no standing to sue the village. The individual had conceded he was not the owner of the vehicle, and the court found that his voluntary $22 payment towards the debt of another did not establish sufficient a "legal interest" to satisfy the standing requirements for his lawsuit. Bey v. Village of Midlothian, et al.

Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a local liquor commissioner's revocation of liquor licenses for two establishments in Raven Place v. City of Blue Island.

A licensee was issued liquor licenses for two establishments in a city. In 2021, 23 gunshots were fired towards one of the licensed establishments and the establishment's security personnel returned fire. The mayor (who also serves as the local liquor commissioner) issued an emergency seven day closure of that establishment. Later that month, the city entered into an agreement with the licensee that established certain conditions and restrictions to the continued operation of both licensed establishments in the city. Under the agreement, the licensee agreed to use ID scanners, impose age restrictions and restricted hours of operation, to pay a $7,500 fine, among other restrictions. A year later while the agreement was in effect, there was another shooting at one of the establishments and the mayor issued a second seven day emergency closure order, and subsequently conducted hearings and issued two orders determining that the businesses were a "nuisance" and that the licensee had failed to comply with the agreement with the city. The mayor revoked both liquor licenses. The licensee appealed the revocation orders to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, which upheld the city's decision to revoke both licenses. The licensee then filed an administrative review action with the circuit court challenging both revocation orders, which court ruled against the licensee finding that one of the appeals was untimely and the other appeal was unfounded.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the licensee argued that the circuit court should have decided both appeals, that the businesses did not constitute a nuisance, and that the licensee's due process rights had been violated. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court that the licensee's appeal of the first revocation order was not timely and that it was improper for the licensee to combine both appeals into one administrative review action. Second, the court determined that both revocation orders were proper and upheld the city's decisions to revoke the liquor licenses for both establishments.

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