Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court and more...

Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court

In Fox v. DuPage Township, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former employees' First Amendment claim that they were terminated because they campaigned for an opposing candidate for election to government office.

After an election that changed the make-up of township government, the township board voted to reorganize a senior center's leadership, resulting in the termination of two employees from their employment at the center. They sued, claiming that they were terminated in retaliation for their campaigning for the township supervisor's opponent in the election. The district court rejected their arguments and ruled in favor of the township, finding that the two former employees had failed to show that their protected First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in their termination. They appealed.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision. To make a retaliation case against the government in a First Amendment claim, the former employees were required to show that their speech was constitutionally protected, they suffered a deprivation likely to deter their speech, and their speech was "at least a motivating factor" in the government's action. Here, the Court held that the two former employees did not meet the third requirement because they provided no direct evidence that their participation in the opponent's campaign was a motivating factor in their terminations. Instead, they relied on an inference of "suspicious timing" which was not sufficient in this case because they could not show that the government knew of their protected conduct. The township also showed alternative reasons for their termination. As a result, the former employees failed to show they were retaliated against based on their First Amendment activities.

11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional

In Scott v. City of Daytona Beach, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down several provisions of a city ordinance that restricted panhandling.

Daytona Beach, Florida, enacted Ordinance No. 19-27 in 2019. The ordinance banned “aggressive panhandling” throughout the city, banned traditional panhandling in numerous locations, and restricted certain methods of panhandling.

Four men who regularly panhandled in Daytona Beach challenged the ordinance both facially and as applied to them, arguing it violated their First Amendment free-speech rights. After conducting a lengthy standing analysis for each plaintiff and each challenged provision, the court addressed the merits of the constitutional claims.

First, relying on existing precedent, the Court reaffirmed that panhandling is protected speech under the First Amendment. The Court next determined that the challenged provisions were “content-based” rather than “content-neutral” regulations, meaning that the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of constitutional review, requiring a compelling government interest pursued through the least speech-restrictive means.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the city argued that the ordinance was necessary to advance the compelling government interests of protecting public health and promoting traffic safety. While the Court acknowledged that both can be compelling government interests, it concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The Court also noted that the city could pursue both interests through less speech-restrictive means, including the enforcement of existing laws such as disorderly conduct or trespassing.

As a result, the Court struck down those portions of the ordinance that were found unconstitutional. The Court also upheld an award of $80,000 in damages to the plaintiffs.

Note that this decision covers the 11th Circuit and not the 7th Circuit in which Illinois is located. However, the content-based versus content-neutral analysis comes from U.S. Supreme Court precedent that applies to all states.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando, Ancel Glink

Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

A candidate applied for a probationary police officer position with a city police department. As part of the application process, the city conducted a background investigation that found two police reports that included allegations of assault and stalking by the candidate against two women. After investigating the incidents and interviewing the candidate, the city removed the candidate from the eligibility list for dishonesty during the interview and past criminal conduct. The candidate challenged his disqualification with the city's police board which upheld the decision. He then filed an appeal with the circuit court which also upheld the city's disqualification.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the candidate argued that the disqualification was "unjust" because he had never been arrested. He also claimed the allegations made by the two women were false. Finally, he claimed the city violated his due process rights. The city defended its disqualification decision, arguing that they had sufficient evidence to dispute his claims, including records of two prior arrests.

First, the Appellate Court reviewed the bases relied upon by the city for its disqualification decision (impersonation of a police officer, conduct indicating violent tendencies, and false statements during the application process) and determined that the city had ample evidence to support its decision to disqualify the candidate from the eligibility list for the position of probationary police officer.

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the candidate's claim that his due process rights were violated, finding that he received written notice of his disqualification, he took full advantage of the opportunity to challenge his disqualification through a written appeal to the police board, and that there is no legal requirement that disqualified applicants are entitled to an in-person hearing to confront witnesses. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the city's decision to disqualify him from the police officer position. Navarro-Angulo v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al.

Court Rules Against Journalists in Lawsuit Against Police Officers for Injuries Sustained at a Protest

In Schukar, et al. v. Kenosha County, et al., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s decision in favor of police officers in a First and Fourth Amendment case brought by photojournalists relating to a protest incident.

On August 25, 2020, two photojournalists were documenting a protest at the Kenosha County Courthouse. The protest was sparked by the shooting of a 29-year-old Black male by a City of Kenosha police officer. During the protest, both protestors and police officers launched objects at one another, including the officers’ launching of foam batons that hit and injured the journalists. Shortly after the incident, the journalists filed a lawsuit against two police officers who were at the protest. They claimed the officers intentionally struck them in retaliation for engaging in the First Amendment protected activity of protesting and used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the journalists, who appealed the district court’s ruling.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the police officers. As to the journalists' First Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found there was no evidence that either officer intentionally targeted the journalists for engaging in their First Amendment right to protest. The Court found that the officers’ use-of-force reports (which failed to accurately state the total number of rounds deployed during the protest) were not enough to show that the officers intentionally targeted the photojournalists.

As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit determined that it was not "clearly established" by case law whether an officer’s intentional deployment of less-than-lethal munitions that hit unintended targets during a protest constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the journalists could not defeat the officers' claims of qualified immunity.

Authored by Rachel Stempler, Ancel Glink

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 8th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA for not responding to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 26-008.

A requester submitted a FOIA request for copies of agendas for all meetings of the village for a 4 month period. He followed up with a second FOIA request seeking records pertaining to mold remediation at village hall and asking the village to respond to several questions. Ten days after he submitted his requests, he filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village failed to respond to either FOIA request. After the PAC reached out to the village for a response and did not hear from the village, it issued a binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA requests.

Although there is nothing new in this opinion regarding a public body's obligation to respond to FOIA, the PAC did include the following footnote in its opinion noting that the village had no obligation to answer the questions posed by the requester in his second FOIA request (see below):

13. To the extent that Mr. Kilbanerei's request asked questions concerning the location of Village documents and any plans to relocate Village documents, FOIA does not require the Village to answer those questions. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ("The Act does not compel the agency to provide answers to questions posed by the inquirer.").

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