A. reporter submitted a FOIA request to a State's Attorney's Office (SAO) seeking. records about a former SAO employee who was terminated and criminally charged. for alleged misconduct while working at the SAO. The SAO withheld a responsive termination ...
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Municipal Minute

PAC Finds FOIA Violation in Response to Request for Termination Letter

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a State's Attorney's Office (SAO) seeking records about a former SAO employee who was terminated and criminally charged for alleged misconduct while working at the SAO. The SAO withheld a responsive termination letter on the basis that the letter, if disclosed, would interfere with a pending criminal prosecution and picking of a jury.

After the requester submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), the PAC issued its second binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the SAO improperly withheld the termination letter. PAC Op. 26-002.

First, the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Section 7(1)(d) only apply to records either (1) created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings, or (2) if the record is maintained by a correctional or law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes. In this case, the PAC determined that the termination letter was not created during the course in the course of an administrative enforcement proceeding. The PAC also determined that the letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” because the letter was a personnel record created by the SAO to document a former employee’s termination. Because the withheld letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) did not apply to allow the SAO to withhold the record.

Second, the PAC determined that the SAO did not demonstrate that disclosing the letter would interfere with law enforcement proceedings or create a substantial likelihood that a person would be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing. Although the SAO argued that the court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of information in the letter, the PAC reasoned that FOIA does not provide a blanket exemption for records that may contain information that may be inadmissible in court. The PAC found that the SAO did not illustrate that revealing previously undisclosed information in the letter is likely to garner intense pre-trial publicity that could taint the pool of potential jurors in the county. Even if some potential jurors were exposed to the letter, the PAC argued that the SAO could use judicial safeguards, like voir dire, to identify and exclude potential jurors whose knowledge of relevant information may taint their impartiality. While the letter contains allegations that have not been publicly disseminated or reported on, the PAC reasoned that disclosing the letter would not interfere with the prosecution of the former SAO employee, because it does not contain highly specific details (e.g., identities of witnesses, sensitive details that would materially impact witness testimony, or evidentiary proof or sources of evidence) that would interfere with a law enforcement proceeding.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 101 - Navigating AI's Impact on the Modern Workplace

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 101 featuring Mysi Hall's recent ILCMA presentation, “Digital Decisions: Navigating AI’s Impact on the Modern Workplace.” In this podcast, Mysi examines the current legal landscape surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in labor relations and employment practices.

Highlights:

  • The Legal Landscape: Overview of federal and state regulations, including EEOC guidelines on Title VII and the ADA.
  • Illinois Specifics: A look at the AI Video Interview Act (AIVIA) and the 2026 amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act.
  • Bias and Mitigation: Understanding automation bias, selective adherence, and real-world examples of algorithmic discrimination.
  • Labor Relations: How major unions (ILA, SAG-AFTRA, AFL-CIO) are negotiating AI safeguards and transparency.
  • Best Practices: Practical steps for employers, including the NIST Risk Management Framework and the importance of human oversight.

Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act’s Impact on Units of Local Government and Road Districts

On January 8, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed the Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act (CRGA) into law. With an effective date of June 1, 2026, the Act brings several changes to state energy policy intended to develop new energy resources.

The Act amends state statute to restrict the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees, fines, or other payment obligations for road use agreements with a commercial wind energy facility or a commercial solar energy facility owner (including the facility developer).

Previously, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code stated that road-related fees, permit fees, or other charges imposed under a road use agreement must be reasonably related to the administration cost of such agreement.

Under the new amendment, a road district or other unit of local government is prohibited from requiring any permit fees, fines, or other payment obligations as a condition of a road use agreement, unless the reasonable permit fee or payment obligation reflects the actual expenses incurred. These expenses must relate to the negotiation, execution, construction, or implementation of the road use agreement.

The new amendment also prohibits a road use agreement from requiring a facility owner to pay or perform any road work that is not specifically and uniquely related to the road improvements required for the facility or the restoration of roads used by the facility owner during construction-related activities. 

In effect, the Act constrains the scope of road use agreements and the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees related to commercial alternative energy facilities. However, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code does not expressly provide that it is a denial and limitation on home rule powers and functions.

Authored by Luigi Laudando and Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

  

More Bills Introduced in General Assembly to Amend FOIA

On January 20th, we reported on a number of bills introduced in the Illinois General Assembly this term that would, if approved, amend various provisions of FOIA. Since that post, the General Assembly has been quite busy and has introduced many more bills that propose to amend FOIA, many of which appear to be designed to address the recent proliferation of "mass" requests submitted by organizations that seek the same records from numerous numerous public bodies. 

HB 4597: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to authorize a public body to impose a fee on a requester for staff time incurred in redacting body camera recordings, at the lowest paid employee's pay rate. The bill has some exceptions where a fee may not be imposed, including (1) where the requester certifies that it will not use the recording for financial purposes; or (2) the requester is involved in the incident; or (3) the recording depicts an officer-involved shooting; or (4) the public body fails to provide the requester with an estimate of the applicable fees as required by the bill.

HB  4681: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add provisions relating to "mass" requesters and "vexatious" requesters and expand the definition of "commercial" requester. The bill would also require requesters to notify the public body before filing a lawsuit against the public body for an alleged violation of FOIA. The bill would provide a process for public bodies to petition the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney Generals Office (PAC) for relief from "vexatious" requesters, and also provide additional time to respond to "mass" requesters.

HB 4682: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to provide that repeated requests for commercial purposes are deemed unduly burdensome if the reuqests are from the same person and seek similar or updated records.

HB 4683: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add language regarding "mass" requesters and provide additional time for the public body to respond to requests from requesters that fall into that category. 

HB 4684: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify the definition of "commercial purpose" and add a new provision for "purposeless mass requests."

HB 4704: If approved, this bill would amend the Student Confidentiality Reporting Act and FOIA to prohibit the release of information submitted to school helplines.

SB 3218: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify provisions relating to law enforcement and arrest and booking records, increase the allowable fee for copies from 15 cents to 25 cents, and modify the amount public bodies can charge for staff time in searching for and retrieving records requested for commercial purposes.

None of these bills have passed yet, but we will keep you posted if any of these move forward.


Seventh Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

In Johnson v. Edwards, an arrestee sued four police officers alleging they violated his constitutional rights after he was arrested for disorderly conduct. 

Johnson was arrested after he attempted to enter an area that had been taped off for police investigation of a crime scene. When the police officers ordered Johnson to leave the area, he became agitated and began to yell at the officers. Johnson refused to leave and the officers arrested Johnson, put him in the squad car, and drove him to the police station. Johnson had refused to wear his seatbelt on the drive there. On the way there, Johnson asked the officer to slow down. The officer quickly slowed the car down to stop at a red light which caused Johnson to lurch forward and hit his head on the divider. Two minutes later, when they arrived at the station, the officers realized Johnson had been knocked unconscious. He was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed and treated for a cut lip.

Johnson was charged with disorderly conduct for failing to obey a police officer. After the charges were dropped, he sued the officers involved in his arrest, claiming the following constitutional violations: (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) state-created danger in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (3) excessive use of force for the “rough ride” to the station; (4) failure to provide adequate medical care. Johnson also brought a claim for malicious prosecution. The district court ruled in favor of the police officers, finding they were immune from Johnson’s claims based on qualified immunity. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit found that Johnson had not established a violation of his constitutional rights because: (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for engaging in disorderly conduct when he refused to leave the crime scene; (2) the officers had not placed Johnson in a position of danger, or violated an established constitutional right, by allowing him to ride to the station without a seatbelt on; (3) the facts did not support a finding that the ride to the station constituted an excessive use of force; and (4) the officers had called the paramedics as soon as they realized Johnson was hurt, so Johnson could not establish that they acted unreasonably. Because Johnson failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right, the Seventh Circuit found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

As to Johnson’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct and dismissed this claim.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter