PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding and more...

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 8th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA for not responding to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 26-008.

A requester submitted a FOIA request for copies of agendas for all meetings of the village for a 4 month period. He followed up with a second FOIA request seeking records pertaining to mold remediation at village hall and asking the village to respond to several questions. Ten days after he submitted his requests, he filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village failed to respond to either FOIA request. After the PAC reached out to the village for a response and did not hear from the village, it issued a binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA requests.

Although there is nothing new in this opinion regarding a public body's obligation to respond to FOIA, the PAC did include the following footnote in its opinion noting that the village had no obligation to answer the questions posed by the requester in his second FOIA request (see below):

13. To the extent that Mr. Kilbanerei's request asked questions concerning the location of Village documents and any plans to relocate Village documents, FOIA does not require the Village to answer those questions. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ("The Act does not compel the agency to provide answers to questions posed by the inquirer.").

Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

An Illinois Appellate Court held that a board of fire and police commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear disciplinary charges against a police officer because the hearing was not held within 30 days of the filing of the charges. Harris v. City of Madison Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.

A city police chief filed written disciplinary charges with the city's board of fire and police commission seeking a police officer's removal from the police department. The charges alleged that the officer fraudulently documented time spent patrolling. The board commenced a hearing but heard no testimony, received no evidence, did not render a decision, and instead continued the matter. The officer filed a lawsuit against the board claiming that because the board failed to conduct a hearing within the 30 day time frame required by state statute, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the pending disciplinary charges. After the circuit court denied the city's motion to dismiss because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing within the statutory timeframe, the police chief filed a second set of disciplinary charges with the board. The officer then filed a motion with the circuit court seeking an injunction to stop the board from conducting a hearing, arguing that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not conduct the original hearing within the statutory timeframe. The circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding the second set of disciplinary charges to be a new filing that could proceed to hearing.

The officer appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court cited to section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code that requires a board of fire and police commission to conduct a hearing on written charges "within 30 days of the filing" of the charges with the board. The Appellate Court found that the original disciplinary charges were never voluntarily dismissed by the city nor was the original proceeding terminated by the board (it was continued by the board). As a result, the Court held that the second set of charges (which were identical to the first) did not "restart" the statutory 30 day period for commencing a hearing, so the board had no jurisdiction to proceed on the disciplinary charges against the officer.

Ordinance Violation Order Vacated for Failure to Properly Serve Notice of Administrative Hearing

An Illinois Appellate Court reversed a city's decision regarding an ordinance violation, finding that the city lacked jurisdiction because it failed to properly serve the homeowner under the city's hearing and notice procedures. McCain v. City of Granite City.

A city sent a homeowner letters notifying her that her property was in violation of several local property maintenance regulations. The letters gave her a few weeks to cure the violations, and when that deadline passed without a cure, the city sent notice to the homeowner by regular mail of an administrative hearing on the violations. The homeowner argued that the city's service of notice of the hearing was defective because she was not served personally as required by section 2-203 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The homeowner did not appear at the administrative hearing, and the city's administrative officer found her liable and issued a decision ordering her to pay fines in the amount of $575, plus court fees. The homeowner appealed the judgment to the circuit court, arguing that the administrative hearing officer had no jurisdiction to issue the decision because she was not properly served with the complaint.

The city argued that its notice to appear was adequate to initiate an enforcement action that doesn't involve a jail sentence, and that personal service of the complaint and a summons was not required. The circuit court agreed with the city, finding that the city properly served the homeowner with notice to appear, and that there was no violation of the homeowner's due process rights where she had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the city. As an initial matter, the Appellate Court rejected the homeowner's argument that the Code of Civil Procedure (state statute) applied to the city's administrative hearing process, finding that the city had authority to establish its own hearing process and notice requirements for administrative hearings on ordinance violations. Nevertheless, the court did find that the city violated its own hearing procedures, which required that notice of an administrative hearing be served personally, by certified mail, or by posting notice on the property. Because the city served the notice by regular mail (which was not identified in the city's procedures), it did not comply with the city's own service requirements. The Court also noted that the city's own procedures required that certain information be included in the notice, such as the fine and any penalties for late payment or failure to attend the hearing, but that information was not included in the city's notice to the homeowner. Because the city failed to comply with its own service requirements, the Court found that the hearing body did not have jurisdiction to conduct the administrative hearing and vacated the violation order and fines.

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Takings" Challenge to City's Rental Assistance Ordinance

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a "takings" challenge to a city ordinance that protects tenants in residential buildings when ownership is transferred through a foreclosure action. BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago.

In 2021, the City of Chicago adopted the "Keep Chicago Renting Ordinance." That ordinance requires anyone who obtains a rental property through a foreclosure action to negotiate new leases with existing tenants in good faith and if the tenant declines to renew a lease, pay the tenant $10,600 to assist with relocation expenses. When BBLI took control of a rental property through a sheriff's deed in 2024, BBLI followed the procedures under the ordinance for negotiating new leases, but at least five tenants declined new leases and requested the relocation assistance fee. BBLI filed a lawsuit against the city claiming that the ordinance violated its civil rights because requiring payment of the fee constituted an unconstitutional "takings" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, and BBLI appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit uphold the dismissal of the case.

First, the Court found that the city had authority to adopt the ordinance as a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship.

Second, the Court rejected BBLI's argument that the relocation assistance fee requirement was a "physical" taking because it transfers wealth, finding this ordinance to be similar to rent control regulations which courts have found are not "physical" takings.

Third, the Court did not find a "regulatory" taking because, among other things, the city's ordinance did not interfere with BBLI's "investment-backed expectations" since the ordinance was already in effect when BBLI purchased the property.

Finally, the Court rejected BBLI's "unconstitutional conditions" argument because BBLI was not asking for permission to build or engage in some other lawful activity that the city was withholding or imposing conditions on the issuance. Instead, the ordinance was enacted to further the city's interest in keeping its residents housed.

In short, the Court upheld the dismissal of BBLI's "takings" challenge to the rental assistance ordinance.

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of OMA Because Agenda Description Was Not Sufficient

In its 7th binding opinion for 2026, the Public Access Counselor for the Illinois Attorney General (PAC) found a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act by taking final action at a board meeting without setting forth the general subject matter of the item on the meeting agenda. PAC Op. 26-007. The PAC did find the board provided an adequate public recital prior to voting on the matter, however.

A reporter filed a complaint with the PAC alleging that a public body voted on the creation of new employment positions without adequately describing the proposed action on its meeting agenda or providing a sufficient public recital prior to voting. The vote to create the new positions was taken under the agenda item "Approval of Supervisor's Report." The PAC watched the video recording of the meeting and noted that the Supervisor suggested adding five new employment positions during his Supervisor's report, and that a motion was made to approve the necessary hires, the motion seconded, and then a vote taken by the board to approve that motion.

The board defended its actions, stating that no formal action had been taken by the board since these hires were within the Supervisor's authority, and that the board's vote was not final action but "merely a formality." The PAC rejected that argument, stating that the board's vote "resolved the question of whether the Board approved of the creation of those positions," which constituted final action under the OMA. The PAC then determined that the agenda listing did not comply with Section 2.02(c) of the OMA, which requires that a meeting agenda set forth the general subject matter of any ordinance or resolution that will be the subject of final action at a meeting. (Note that the PAC opinion does not state that the action taken by the board even involved the approval of an ordinance or resolution, and instead only references a motion being made, seconded, and voted on at the meeting).

As for the reporter's claim that the board did not provide an adequate public recital prior to taking a vote, the PAC rejected that argument, finding that the Supervisor described each of the positions involved in the motion and detailed the justification for the proposed new hires. The PAC noted that a discussion of the financial impacts of the new hires was not required, and that the discussion prior to the actual vote complied with Section 2(e) of the OMA.

Municipal Minute