Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood and more...

Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood

Two years ago, the State of Illinois began the process of consolidating the operation and management of programs previously administered by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), and the Governor’s Office of Early Childhood Development (GOECD). As of July 1, 2026, the Illinois Department of Early Childhood (IDEC) began operations to complete the transition.

Just before IDEC began operating, the Governor signed into law Public Act 104-0480 adopting comprehensive reforms in license regulations for day care centers. The new act creates three tiers of licensing and registration: Day Care Center Providers, Recognized Alternative Providers and Exempt Providers. Most importantly for local governments, the amendments re-affirm the State’s double exemption for programs operated by local governments so long as those programs meet defined statutory parameters. Eligible programs will be exempt from regulation as a Day Care Center Provider and from registration as a Recognized Alternative Provider.

To qualify for the double exemption, a local government (or combination of local governments pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement) may demonstrate it is operating a special activities program, such as athletics, recreation, crafts instruction, music, dance, drama, sports, or similar activities offered by a unit of local government, including special activities programs offered by 2 or more units of local government pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. (There are other exemptions for school-based extracurricular activities conducted outside of the school day.)

These types of special activities programs will qualify for the double exemption if they demonstrate all the following requirements:

(A) State law authorizes the unit of local government to offer the program and an elected or appointed board of the unit of local government has adopted policies governing the operation of the program, pursuant to Section 8-10 of the Park District Code or other applicable law.

(B) The program is offered to the following categories of children and the parent or legal guardian of each child has received written acknowledgement that the program is not licensed by the Department under this Act:

(i) children at least 5 years of age for no more than 100 continuous days in any 12-month period when school is not in session;

(ii) children at least 3 years of age for no more than 3.5 continuous hours at a time; or

(iii) children under 3 years of age for no more than one hour at a time.

(C) The program does not advertise to the public as a pre-school program, licensed early care and education provider, licensed child care, or licensed day care.

(D) The program conducts the following investigations on all employees of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(E) The program conducts the following investigations on all volunteers of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(F) The unit of local government has an emergency preparedness and response plan for the location of the special activities program.

(G) The program does not participate in the Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) or receive funding pursuant to the Early Childhood Block Grant.

If a program fails to satisfy all the requirements, it will be required to either obtain a license as a day care center or register as a recognized alternative provider.

Some local governments have recently been asked by DCFS to “apply” for exempt status. Public Act 104-0480 clarifies whether this is necessary. Section 3.01 of the Child Care Act, as amended, provides

The Department of Early Childhood shall provide written verification of exemption and description of compliance with standards for the health, safety, and development of the children who receive the services upon submission by the provider of, in addition to any other documentation required by the Department of Early Childhood, a notarized statement that the provider facility complies with: (1) the standards of the Department of Public Health or local health department, (2) the fire safety standards of the State Fire Marshal, and (3) if operated in a public school building, the health and safety standards of the State Board of Education.

The amendments related to licensing and registration requirements will become effective for all providers other than park districts on July 1, 2027, but not until July 1, 2028 for park districts. Programs operating under a current 2-year licensing exemption shall be allowed to continue to operate under that exemption until it expires or until July 1, 2028, whichever is later.

Keep an eye open for IDEC adopting new administrative regulations implementing the revised statutory scheme.

Post Authored by Adam Simon, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Hawaii law that prohibited firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Wolford v. Lopez.

Following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which ended “may-issue” concealed carry licensing schemes, Hawaii enacted HRS § 134-9.5. The law provided that a person carrying a licensed firearm could not enter or remain on private property of another person “unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property.” Such authorization could be provided through unambiguous written or verbal consent or the posting of clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance of the building or elsewhere on the premises.

The Supreme Court held that the law conflicted with the common law presumption that members of the public, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter private property open to the public unless expressly prohibited from doing so. As a result, the Court concluded that Hawaii’s law unconstitutionally burdened individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense. In addition, the Hawaii law could not be justified by the country's historical firearm regulations.

This ruling does not raise concerns regarding the applicability of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/et seq.). Illinois follows a system where firearms are presumptively allowed on private property unless the owner posts statutorily prescribed signage prohibiting them. This is consistent with the common law presumption. Hawaii took the opposite approach, presumptively prohibiting firearms on private property by requiring signage indicating that carrying firearms was authorized. Illinois law requires that property owners take affirmative steps to exclude firearms, whereas Hawaii’s approach required that property owners take affirmative steps to allow them.

This decision impacts California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, which have laws similar to Hawaii’s.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink

PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records

A news media requester submitted a FOIA request to a police department seeking records related to an investigation of an arrested individual for a domestic incident. The department entirely denied its responsive records to the request citing FOIA’s personal privacy exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. After the requester submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the department improperly withheld its responsive records. PAC Op. 26-006

The PAC first noted that previous PAC opinions were clear that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of information concerning arrests that outweighs an arrestee's right to privacy. Also, because the requester is a news reporter seeking to report about a matter of high public interest (the arrest of a police officer), there was a heightened public interest in disclosure of information regarding this arrest.

Because the department’s records contain information that was incidental or had no bearing on the arrest or circumstances leading to the arrest, including the names and personally identifying information (contact information, nature of relationship with arrestee) of witnesses and third parties, the PAC determined that the department was authorized to redact that personal information pursuant to Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. However, the department was required to release the remaining non-exempt parts of its responsive records to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast released Episode 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam. In this episode, the American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 11th Annual “Bar Exam” Planning Law Session. Recorded live at Goodwin’s in Chicago, this realistic, simulated law school experience tests planners and land use professionals on the latest legal precedents in wind energy, annexation, and First Amendment protections. As is tradition, all participants passed the bar, and teams competed for the prestigious (and five-foot-tall) Ancel Glink Cup. In this episode, Ancel Glink’s Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Tyler Smith are joined by special guest Phil Green, a Local Gov 250 Government Champion, who undergoes a high-tech “firmware update” to become the session’s first AI-powered planning law assistant.

In This Episode

§ [00:00] The Roll Call: Host Dan Bolin calls the meeting to order with professors Megan Mack and Tyler Smith, plus local government champion Phil Green.

§ [05:00] Round 1: Democracy at the Doorstep: Phil discusses his recognition as a Local Gov 250 Champion and his work on “democracy at the doorstep” in Hoffman Estates.

§ [11:30] Case 1.1 - Wind Farm Bans: A look at Hickory Wind LLC v. Village of Cedar Point, exploring why outright bans on lawful land uses exceed non-home rule authority.

§ [19:00] Case 1.2 - Zoning Finality: In Chosen Consulting LLC v. Town Council of Highland, we learn why ADA and discrimination claims do not bypass the requirement for a final zoning decision.

§ [22:30] Case 1.3 - Cross-Examination Rights: A resort project in Galena highlights the importance of maintaining a record when residents forfeit their right to cross-examine witnesses.

§ [26:30] Round 2: The Road to Houston: Phil shares takeaways from serving as the Education Chair for NPC26 in Detroit and teases a “Moon Joy” theme for NPC27 in Houston.

§ [31:45] Case 2.1 - Forceful Annexation: We review a 4.7% perimeter gap in Husky Transportation v. Village of Barrington Hills to define the “wholly bounded” standard.

§ [35:45] Case 2.2 - First Amendment Retaliation: The saga of the Minocqua Brewing Co. demonstrates that permit denials are not retaliatory if they would have occurred regardless of protected speech.

§ [39:15] Case 2.3 - The Hamburger UFOs: A whimsical mural case from Kansas tests “intermediate scrutiny” and whether cities can prove that burger art is more distracting than flower art.

§ [42:00] The Future of Planning Law: Megan and Tyler discuss the responsible use of AI in legal practice and how municipalities are responding to data center controversies involving power and water consumption.

§ [46:15] The Reveal of A.I. CPU: Phil Green manifests as the A.I. CPU, an assistant that is 100% confident, 60% accurate, and requires massive amounts of “liquid cooling” to function.

§ [48:00] Round 3: AI-Assisted Answers: The A.I. CPU helps navigate cases on warrantless rental inspections, daily fine calculations, and why missing scaffolding is not a legal defense for safety hazards.

§ [1:02:30] Crowning the Champions: We announce the winners of the 2026 Bar Exam and award the shiny gold Ancel Glink Cup to the “Transit Masters.”

Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

After a police department failed to respond to a news agency's FOIA request, the requester filed a lawsuit. Although the department produced its responsive records during the litigation, the requester filed a petition for civil penalties against the department pursuant to Section 11(j) of FOIA, which states that:

If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence. 5 ILCS 140/11(j).

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that the department had willfully and intentionally violated FOIA because it had knowledge of FOIA’s response requirements and did not to demonstrate a good reason for non-compliance with those requirements. However, relying on prior Illinois cases that required a requester to demonstrate both (1) a willful and intentional violation of FOIA, and (2) that the FOIA violation was deliberate, by design, and done with a dishonest purpose, the circuit court ruled that the requester was not entitled to civil penalties, because the requester did not prove that the department had a dishonest purpose when violating FOIA.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court (First District) reversed the circuit court’s denial of civil penalties, and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine appropriate civil penalties. Lucy Parsons Labs v. Chicago Police Department. The Appellate Court determined that the “or otherwise acted in bad faith” language in Section 11(j) is a catch-all category of possible bad faith actions that a public body can take in violation of FOIA. In other words, the examples of bad faith conduct included in Section 11(j) of FOIA—willful and intentional noncompliance—is an illustrative example of bad faith conduct rather than an exhaustive list. The Appellate Court reasoned that interpreting Section 11(j) of FOIA to require demonstrating that a public body “willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA” supplants the catchall term, and replaces it with the conjunctive “and,” which imposes a higher standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith non-compliance with FOIA, and eliminates the possibility that a “willful and intentional” violation of FOIA could, by itself, warrant civil penalties. In this case, because the circuit court found that the department intentionally and willfully violated FOIA, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court’s order finding that the requester had not met its burden of proof for the imposition of civil penalties against the department was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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