Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference and more...

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum recently released 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

In this episode, Ancel Glink attorneys Tyler Smith and Eugene Bolotnikov discuss options for local governments to navigate the current regulatory landscape of e-bikes and e-scooters. The discussion aims to help communities address concerns regarding public safety while providing some clarity to the owners and operators of these vehicles. Tyler and Eugene recently presented on this topic at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference, delving into the regulatory options available to communities in Illinois.

Special Segment: Public Comment Live from the APA-IL Conference

The episode includes a public comment segment featuring a live question and answer session focused on e-bike and e-scooter regulations, recorded live at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference.
Participants ask questions about communities shifting regulation away from state-defined classes (such as regulating by wattage instead), the inconsistency of regulations between neighboring communities, and the overlapping jurisdiction of municipalities and park districts.
The presenters note that there has been a significant rise in regulatory attention in Illinois, especially in Cook County suburbs, following high-profile, fatal collisions involving e-bikes and vehicles.

In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

During the recent veto session, the Illinois General Assembly passed a large mass transit bill (Senate Bill 2111) which, among other things, would create the "People Over Parking Act." If signed by the Governor, the Act would take effect on June 1, 2026, and restrict local authority to require minimum off-street automobile parking near public transit.

Prohibition on Minimum Off-Street Parking Near Transit

The fundamental effect of the Act is to prohibit local governments from setting requirements for mandatory off-street parking for automobiles in specific areas. With limited exceptions, a unit of local government may not impose or enforce any minimum automobile parking requirements on a development project that is located within:

one-half mile of a public transportation hub; or
one-eighth mile of a public transportation corridor.

Definitions

“Minimum automobile parking requirements” means any law, code, or policy that requires a minimum number of off-street, private parking spaces for new residential and commercial developments. This would include the minimum off-street parking requirements that are common in many local zoning ordinances.

The Act defines “development project” broadly to include nearly any project undertaken for the purpose of development of land. “Development project” does not include a project where any portion is designated for use as a hotel or other specified types of transient lodging.

A “public transportation hub” includes:

a rail transit station,
a boat or ferry terminal served by either a bus stop or rail transit station, and
an intersection of two or more bus routes with a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods.

A “public transportation corridor” means a street on which one or more bus routes have a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods. The Act does not define “morning and afternoon peak commute periods.”

This means the Act could affect Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) stations, Metra stations, Amtrak stations, and certain CTA or Pace bus routes providing frequent bus service.

Impact on Local Authority (Preemption of Home Rule Authority)

The Act applies to home rule and non-home rule units of local government.

Reserved Powers and Exceptions for Local Governments

While minimum automobile parking requirements would be generally prohibited near transit under this Act, local governments would retain the authority to regulate other aspects of parking and development, including:

Maximum Parking: A unit of local government is not prevented from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a maximum parking requirement.
On-Street Parking: The Act does not prevent a unit of local government from regulating access to on-street parking.
Bicycle Parking: The Act does not restrict a unit of local government from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a minimum parking requirement for bicycles, including electric-assisted bicycles.
Regulation of Voluntarily Provided Parking: If a developer chooses to provide off-street automobile parking voluntarily, the local government may require parking spaces to be:

made available for car-share vehicles;
shared with the public; or
made available only for a fee (a local government may not require voluntarily provided parking to be provided free of charge).

Application to Existing Agreement or Site Plan

The Act would not apply if the requirements conflict with a contractual agreement or approved site plan that was executed or approved on or before the effective date of the Act. However, the prohibition would apply to any amendment or extension to the contractual agreement or approved site plan, if that amendment or extension increases automobile parking requirements. The Act does not define “contractual agreement” or “approved site plan,” so local governments should consult their attorneys about whether the Act would apply.

Next Steps

Local governments may need to evaluate areas in their community near transit that could be affected by the Act, and analyze their current zoning regulations for those areas, specifically their current parking requirements.

If the Governor signs the encompassing transit bill, the Act will be effective on June 1, 2026. If the Act does become effective, local governments could still encourage developers to voluntarily provide more off-street parking by (1) requiring parking spaces to be shared with the public; or (2) adopting on-street parking restrictions. Local governments could also amend their zoning application forms to ask an applicant to proactively assert whether the Act applies, so planning staff can review the grounds for that claim. In any event, local governments should contact their attorneys to evaluate how the Act might affect areas served by public transit.

Post Authored by Daniel J. Bolin, Ancel Glink

Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

The Illinois General Assembly passed a number of bills in the veto session that may be of interest to local governments, including HB 576 which creates the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act. While HB 576 was designed to protect certain state legislative and executive officials, and certain county officials (and not local government officials), the bill's ban on "government agencies" displaying or posting personal information about public officials who make a request that this information not be publicly disclosed expressly applies to units of local government and school districts. The bill has been sent to the Governor for signature.

If signed by the Governor, the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act would prohibit government agencies (including units of local government) from displaying, posting, or disclosing a public official's personal information if the government agency has received a written request from the public official to refrain from disclosing that personal information. It would also require government agencies to remove that content within five business days of a written request under the new Act. The Act also prohibits persons, businesses, and associations from publicly posting or displaying a public official's personal information online when the public official has made a written request that this information not be disclosed.

"Personal information" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Personal information" means a home address, home telephone number, mobile telephone number, pager number, personal email address, social security number, federal tax identification number, checking and savings account numbers, credit card numbers, marital status, and identity of children under the age of 18.

"Public official" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Public official" includes
(1) members or former members of the Illinois General Assembly;
(2) constitutional officers or former constitutional officers;
(3) elected or appointed State's Attorneys
(4) appointed Public Defenders; and
(5) county clerks and members of the Board of Election Commissioners whose responsibilities include administering and overseeing elections.

The bill would also make it unlawful for anyone to knowingly publicly post on the Internet the personal information of a public official or his or her immediate family of the person knows or reasonably should know that publicly posting that information poses an imminent and serious threat to the health and safety of the public official or the public official's immediate family and if the violation is a proximate cause of bodily injury or death of the public official or family member. Violation of this provision would be a Class 3 felony.

The bill would also amend FOIA to expressly exempt the personal information of public officials from disclosure.

The would also make several other changes to various statutes, including the Election Code. First, the bill would amend a provision limiting expenditures by a political committee so that it does not apply to expenses relating to personal security services or cybersecurity measures for public officials. It also requires the State Board of Elections to redact the home addresses of public officials and current and past officers of political committees upon written request, and home addresses of candidates for public office upon expiration of the objection filing period, upon request. The bill would also amend the Vehicle Code and FOID card statute to allow public officials to use their work addresses rather than home addresses on their ID cards and vehicle registration applications.

Court Rules in Favor of Sheriff's Office in FOIA Challenge

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a sheriff's office in a lawsuit challenging the sheriff office's response to a FOIA request submitted by an arrestee who had been detained in county jail. Staake v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Office.

Plaintiff was arrested, booked, and detained in a county jail on various criminal charges. While in county jail, plaintiff allegedly made statements to others over the jail's recorded phone lines about an order of protection his wife had against him as well as the criminal offenses that led to his arrest. Plaintiff filed multiple FOIA requests with the sheriff's office asking for those recordings, but the requests were denied by the sheriff's office. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office claiming it violated FOIA in denying his FOIA request. The trial court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office, agreeing with the sheriff's office that the records were exempt from FOIA because plaintiff failed to establish how those recordings were "relevant" to his pending or potential claims or cases.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reviewed section 7(1)(e-10) of FOIA, which exempts from FOIA the following:

(e-10) Law enforcement records of other persons requested by a person committed to the Department of Corrections, Department of Human Services Division of Mental Health, or a county jail, including, but not limited to, arrest and booking records, mug shots, and crime scene photographs, except as these records may be relevant to the requester's current or potential case or claim.

The Appellate Court analyzed whether Section 7(1)(e-10) applied to the plaintiff's FOIA request and determined that it did, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the requested records "may be relevant" to any pending or potential case or claim. Because he did not meet his burden, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office.

In the Zone: Court Finds No Procedural Due Process Violation in Zoning Challenge

The Illinois Appellate Court recently issued an opinion in a zoning challenge overturning a trial court's ruling that a city's zoning decision violated a neighboring property owner's procedural due process rights. Clark v. City of Galena.

In 2022, a developer filed an application requesting annexation and zoning approvals for a proposed mixed-use development on 80 acres of land in and adjacent to the city. The project included rental cottages, vineyard and winery, gardens, etc. The city's zoning board held a public hearing where the developer presented its application, and neighboring property owners and other interested parties spoke in opposition to the project. After closing the public hearing, the zoning board voted and sent its recommendation to the city council. The city council considered the zoning board's recommendation, and also allowed citizens to provide public comment on the project before voting in favor of both the proposed annexation and zoning approvals for the project. A few months later, the developer proposed amendments to the project, including annexation of additional property, and another zoning board hearing and city council meeting were held, and citizens were again allowed to provide testimony and public comment. The requested zoning changes and annexation of additional territory were approved by the city council.

A neighboring property owner who opposed the project filed a lawsuit against the city and developer to challenge the city's zoning decisions. She claimed that the zoning decisions violated various constitutional rights, including her procedural due process rights. The trial court ruled in favor of the city and developer on all counts except for the neighbor's claim that her procedural due process rights were violated.

The city and developer appealed, and the Appellate Court overturned the trial court's ruling in favor of the neighbor on her procedural due process claims. The Appellate Court noted that zoning decisions are presumed valid, and that the neighbor had the burden to overcome that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the Appellate Court reviewed the process that was held by the city, including the two public hearings held by the zoning board where citizens were allowed to, and did in fact, speak about the project, including the neighbor who filed the lawsuit, and the multiple city council meetings on the project where the city council also allowed public comment, in which the neighbor participated as did other interested citizens. The Court found that both the zoning board and city council discussed the project in detail during that process, and went through the criteria for granting relief, before voting on the project.

The Appellate Court rejected the trial court's determination that the city's procedure deprived the neighbor of her procedural due process rights because the city failed to proactively offer her an opportunity to cross-examine the developer's witnesses. The Appellate Court held that the neighbor had an unlimited opportunity to pose questions about the project, and that she had not made a request to directly cross-examine the developer's witnesses, nor did the city deny such a request, so there was no deprivation of her due process rights.

In sum, the Appellate Court found that the city's process was "thorough and allowed an interchange of evidence and opinions regarding the project," and that the city has an interest in an efficient process. The Court further found that the city was not required to proactively offer an opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses without a request by a citizen, as that would impose an additional burden for little benefit given the process provided in this case. As a result, the Court held that the neighbor failed to meet her burden to provide by clear and convincing evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated by the city's approval of the project. The Court also noted that the neighbor's failure to raise an objection to the city's process at the hearing resulted in a forfeiture of that issue in court.

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