Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund and more...

Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's decision to deny an application for pension membership in Kooistra v. Board of Trustees of Sycamore Police Pension Fund.

A deputy chief in a municipal police department retired from that department and began receiving a retirement pension. Subsequently, he was hired as a patrol officer in a second municipal police department and submitted an application for membership in the second municipality's pension fund. His application was denied by the police pension board based on section 3-124.1(b) of the Police Pension Code, which states as follows:

(b) If a police officer who first becomes a member on or after January 1, 2019 is receiving pension payments (other than as provided in Section 3-109.3) and re-enters active service with any municipality that has established a pension fund under this Article, that police officer may continue to receive pension payments while he or she is in active service, but shall only participate in a defined contribution plan established by the municipality pursuant to Section 3-109.4 and may not establish creditable service in the pension fund established by that municipality or have his or her pension recomputed.” 40 ILCS 5/3-124.1(b)

The pension board determined that this statute precluded the officer from membership in the second municipality's pension fund because he was already receiving pension payments from the first municipality's pension fund; however, he could participate in a defined contribution plan. The officer appealed the pension board's decision to the circuit court which upheld the pension board's decision, and that ruling was then appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the language in Section 3-124.1(b) and determined that it applied to the officer who was drawing a pension from his former employer. The Court rejected the officer's argument that the statutory provision did not apply to him because he became a "member" of the first municipality's pension fund before January 1, 2019. Instead, the Court agreed with the pension board's interpretation of the statute that it applies to the officer because he became a member of the second municipality's police department after the statutory cutoff date. In the Court's view, that was the most logical interpretation because the officer "first" becomes a member of the second municipality's police department upon reentry into active service, which would allow him to continue to receive pension payments from the first municipality but preclude him from participating in the second municipality's pension fund. The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent of this section which was to prevent "double dipping" in two pension funds.

City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

In response to a FOIA request seeking an electronic copy of an incident report, a city denied the request and directed the requester to contact the city police records department to purchase the report at a cost of $5 for residents, or for $10 for non-residents. After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its 13th binding opinion of 2025, finding the City in violation of Section 6(a) of FOIA by improperly assessing a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report. PAC Op. 25-013.

The PAC relied upon the language of Section 6(a) of FOIA, which states that:

Except to the extent that the General Assembly expressly provides, statutory fees applicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to those records when furnished in an electronic format.” (Emphasis added.)

Although the city argued that the report fees were listed on its website, the PAC determiend that the city did not cite a FOIA provision or any other law that authorized the city to charge a special fee for disclosing electronic copies of incident reports. Even if the city had adopted an ordinance establishing those fees, the PAC determined that a municipal ordinance is not a statute. Here, because the Illinois legislature had not expressly authorized a statutory fee in excess of the cost of the recording medium for electronic copies of incident reports, and it was feasible for the city to disclose the report in the electronic format sought by the requester without the need to purchase a recording medium, the city was prohibited by FOIA from assessing the requester a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

A tree service business owned property in a village's general business district. The village informed the business owner that its use of the property was not permitted by the village's zoning ordinance and conducted an administrative hearing on the alleged violation. At the administrative hearing, the business owner argued it was not operating a landscape contractor business as the village claimed, and that its operations were compliant with the village's zoning ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing, tje administrative hearing officer found the business owner to be in violation of the zoning ordinance because (1) it was storing commercial vehicles and equipment on the property outside of an enclosed building, (2) the business operated a landscaping company which was not permitted in the general business district; and (3) commercial vehicles were parked on the property on an overnight basis in violation of the ordinance. The hearing officer issued a $150,000 fine against the business.

The business filed a complaint seeking administrative review of the village's decision that it was in violation of the zoning ordinance. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer's decision, and that decision was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the village's hearing officer's decision against the business, finding that (1) the business was operating a "contractor's shop" which was a permitted use in the business disrict; and (2) the parking of the businesses' commercial vehicles was allowed by the zoning ordinance, which allowed parking of commercial vehicles accessory to a business use. Because the Appellate Court found that the business was not in violation of the village's ordinances, it vacated the $150,000 fine. Tomax Tree Service, LLC v. Village of Westmont

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum recently released 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

In this episode, Ancel Glink attorneys Tyler Smith and Eugene Bolotnikov discuss options for local governments to navigate the current regulatory landscape of e-bikes and e-scooters. The discussion aims to help communities address concerns regarding public safety while providing some clarity to the owners and operators of these vehicles. Tyler and Eugene recently presented on this topic at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference, delving into the regulatory options available to communities in Illinois.

Special Segment: Public Comment Live from the APA-IL Conference

The episode includes a public comment segment featuring a live question and answer session focused on e-bike and e-scooter regulations, recorded live at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference.
Participants ask questions about communities shifting regulation away from state-defined classes (such as regulating by wattage instead), the inconsistency of regulations between neighboring communities, and the overlapping jurisdiction of municipalities and park districts.
The presenters note that there has been a significant rise in regulatory attention in Illinois, especially in Cook County suburbs, following high-profile, fatal collisions involving e-bikes and vehicles.

In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

During the recent veto session, the Illinois General Assembly passed a large mass transit bill (Senate Bill 2111) which, among other things, would create the "People Over Parking Act." If signed by the Governor, the Act would take effect on June 1, 2026, and restrict local authority to require minimum off-street automobile parking near public transit.

Prohibition on Minimum Off-Street Parking Near Transit

The fundamental effect of the Act is to prohibit local governments from setting requirements for mandatory off-street parking for automobiles in specific areas. With limited exceptions, a unit of local government may not impose or enforce any minimum automobile parking requirements on a development project that is located within:

one-half mile of a public transportation hub; or
one-eighth mile of a public transportation corridor.

Definitions

“Minimum automobile parking requirements” means any law, code, or policy that requires a minimum number of off-street, private parking spaces for new residential and commercial developments. This would include the minimum off-street parking requirements that are common in many local zoning ordinances.

The Act defines “development project” broadly to include nearly any project undertaken for the purpose of development of land. “Development project” does not include a project where any portion is designated for use as a hotel or other specified types of transient lodging.

A “public transportation hub” includes:

a rail transit station,
a boat or ferry terminal served by either a bus stop or rail transit station, and
an intersection of two or more bus routes with a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods.

A “public transportation corridor” means a street on which one or more bus routes have a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods. The Act does not define “morning and afternoon peak commute periods.”

This means the Act could affect Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) stations, Metra stations, Amtrak stations, and certain CTA or Pace bus routes providing frequent bus service.

Impact on Local Authority (Preemption of Home Rule Authority)

The Act applies to home rule and non-home rule units of local government.

Reserved Powers and Exceptions for Local Governments

While minimum automobile parking requirements would be generally prohibited near transit under this Act, local governments would retain the authority to regulate other aspects of parking and development, including:

Maximum Parking: A unit of local government is not prevented from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a maximum parking requirement.
On-Street Parking: The Act does not prevent a unit of local government from regulating access to on-street parking.
Bicycle Parking: The Act does not restrict a unit of local government from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a minimum parking requirement for bicycles, including electric-assisted bicycles.
Regulation of Voluntarily Provided Parking: If a developer chooses to provide off-street automobile parking voluntarily, the local government may require parking spaces to be:

made available for car-share vehicles;
shared with the public; or
made available only for a fee (a local government may not require voluntarily provided parking to be provided free of charge).

Application to Existing Agreement or Site Plan

The Act would not apply if the requirements conflict with a contractual agreement or approved site plan that was executed or approved on or before the effective date of the Act. However, the prohibition would apply to any amendment or extension to the contractual agreement or approved site plan, if that amendment or extension increases automobile parking requirements. The Act does not define “contractual agreement” or “approved site plan,” so local governments should consult their attorneys about whether the Act would apply.

Next Steps

Local governments may need to evaluate areas in their community near transit that could be affected by the Act, and analyze their current zoning regulations for those areas, specifically their current parking requirements.

If the Governor signs the encompassing transit bill, the Act will be effective on June 1, 2026. If the Act does become effective, local governments could still encourage developers to voluntarily provide more off-street parking by (1) requiring parking spaces to be shared with the public; or (2) adopting on-street parking restrictions. Local governments could also amend their zoning application forms to ask an applicant to proactively assert whether the Act applies, so planning staff can review the grounds for that claim. In any event, local governments should contact their attorneys to evaluate how the Act might affect areas served by public transit.

Post Authored by Daniel J. Bolin, Ancel Glink

Municipal Minute