County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull and more...

County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a county in a civil rights lawsuit involving the former county coroner's keeping of a family member's skull as a trophy. Betts v. Boone County.

In 1977, a high school student was kidnapped, raped, and murdered and then dumped in a field within the county. As part of the investigation, the county coroner examined the body, and returned the remains to the family, except for the skull, which the coroner kept.

In 2022, the current county coroner contacted the family to inform them that the former coroner had kept at least three skulls, one of which was their family member's. After the family exhumed the casket to place the skull with her remains, they filed a civil rights lawsuit against the county, arguing that the coroner's actions unconstitutionally retained their property in violation of their due process rights. The district court dismissed the case, determining that the family did not show that the former coroner's actions established an official county policy, as required to hold the county liable for its employee's actions.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the legal standard for holding a government liable for civil rights claims for its employees' actions, which requires a person to show that the deprivation of a constitutional right was caused by a municipal policy or custom. Here, the Seventh Circuit held that because state law requires coroners to return all remains to the next of kin, the former coroner did not implement an “official policy” of the county when he kept the skull. Instead, he violated the law. Since the family members could not establish that the county was liable for its former employee's actions, the district court properly dismissed their case.

In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Lawsuit Against County Regarding Denial of Solar Facilities

In January 2023, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 102-1123 (the Act) which, among other things, amended the Counties Code to codify new standards and procedures for the development of “commercial solar energy facilities” in counties across Illinois. Notable provisions of the Act include the following:

A restriction that counties may not adopt zoning regulations that “disallow, permanently ortemporarily,” commercial solar energy facilities in agricultural or industrial districts,
Guidelines regarding maximum setbacks, fencing requirements, height, vegetative screening, etc.,
A provision allowing counties to adopt standards for solar facilities, so long as county requirements are not “more restrictive” than those specified in the Act,
A requirement that counties hold public hearings prior to making decisions to approve or deny solar facilities, and
A provision stating that requests for siting approval or special use permits “shall be approved” if a request complies with the Counties Code, the local county zoning ordinance, and relevant state and federal statutes and regulations.

In 2024, two solar development companies submitted separate applications to a county seeking to develop commercial solar energy facilities within the county. Over the following several months, the developers appeared before the county zoning board of appeals and the zoning committee, which held public hearings and recommended that the county board deny the proposed project under the county’s unified development ordinance (UDO). Both projects were ultimately denied by the county board, and each developer filed a lawsuit requesting (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the county to issue their requested permits, and (2) a declaration that their project applications should be approved. The developers claimed their applications complied with the Act and all provisions of the UDO, and therefore the county was obligated to approve their application and issue all necessary permits for their projects. The county moved to dismiss both cases, arguing that the Act did not give the developers an absolute right to the permits requested.

The trial court ruled in the county's favor, dismissing both cases. The court determined that mandamus was not available because the county could not be compelled to exercise its discretionary zoning authority to issue siting approval or special use permits for the facilities. Furthermore, the court found that the developer’s claim for declaratory judgment was insufficiently plead, and gave the developers an opportunity to replead their complaint. Instead, both developers appealed the trial court’s decision, and the cases were consolidated before the Fourth District Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the decision of the trial court, determining that mandamus was not available given the discretion vested in the county to make local zoning decisions (particularly decisions to grant or deny applications for special use permits). Tate Road Solar 1, LLC, et al. v. County of Winnebago. The Court found the Act did not prohibit the county from exercising discretion in determining whether to issue permits. Instead, by allowing counties to regulate commercial solar energy facilities as “special uses,” the Illinois General Assembly plainly intended that counties maintain some discretion over approval and siting for these land uses. The Court also determined that counties were permitted to apply their traditional, subjective standards used when making local zoning decisions. Additionally, because the Act requires a public hearing before a permit can be issued, the Court found that the county would need to exercise discretion in accepting testimony and evidence, and then weighing various standards to determine whether a permit should be issued. While the Act codified certain limitations on local authority to regulate solar facilities, the Court determined the General Assembly did not eliminate counties’ traditional discretion to make local zoning decisions. Therefore, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to force the county to approve the developer’s applications and issue permits for the facilities.

As to the developers’ claims for declaratory judgment, the Court found that because the developers did not have a “clear right” to the permits, there was no actual controversy the developers could plead to seek a declaration that their permits be issued. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision dismissing the developers’ lawsuits for failing to state a proper claim for mandamus or declaratory relief.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

Case Was Properly Dismissed Where Appeal Not Served on City

In Crane v. City of Rockford, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of an appeal of an administrative hearing officer's issuance of fines for building code violations where the property owner did not comply with the service requirements of state law.

A municipal administrative hearing officer found a property owner in violation of various building code provisions and assessed a fine of $64,000. The property owner filed an appeal with the circuit court within the statutory 35 day period but failed to properly serve the City and other defendants as required by section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on noncompliance with the service requirements of state law, and the circuit court and Appellate Courts ruled in favor of the City, finding that section 3-103 was mandatory, and both the filing of the appeal and "issuance of summons" on the defendants has to be accomplished within 35 days of the date the administrative decision is served. Here, although the owner had filed an affidavit with the filed complaint identifying the hearing officer and mayor as defendants to be served, he failed to pay the fee for certified mailing of the summonses, so they were not issued. As a result, his appeal of the $64,000 fine was properly dismissed.

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 106: Legislative Update

Ancel Glink has released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 106: Legislative Update. The Illinois General Assembly recently concluded its spring legislative session and Ancel Glink’s Greg Jones and Tyler Smith join us to talk about recent legislation local governments should know, including updates on housing grants, e-bike and e-scooter regulations, hemp regulations, and more!

In This Episode:

[00:00] Baseball Fever: Greg and Tyler discuss their favorite all-time and underrated players, including Lou Whitaker, Barry Bonds, and Anthony Rizzo.
[03:45] The "Build Plan" vs. The "REAL Act": We review Governor Pritzker’s Build Plan omnibus package, which sought to preempt local zoning for housing but ultimately failed to advance. We also discuss the IML’s alternative REAL Act.
[09:00] Housing Grants: Even though the Build Plan didn't pass, the FY27 budget allocated hundreds of millions for housing, including funds for the Missing Middle program, SmartBuy, and Opening Doors.
[10:45] E-Bikes & E-Scooters: New statewide standards for electric micromobility devices effectively preempt home rule authority for regulating these devices, starting January 1, 2027 .(SB3484)
[14:45] The Illinois Hemp Act & Cannabis: Illinois repeals the Industrial Hemp Act to align with federal standards, effective November 12, 2026. This bill also doubles the legal possession limit for cannabis to 60 grams and extends dispensary hours to 2 a.m., subject to local zoning. (SB3222)
[17:45] Operational Updates: Briefing on HB4541 regarding overpayments under the Unclaimed Property Act and HB1353 protecting volunteer emergency workers during training.
[19:30] Financial Posting & Trusts: Coverage of HB2137 regarding website financial posting requirements, SB638 on OPEB trust funds, and SB2102 on electronic filing receipts.
[22:45] Special Districts: New rules for dissolving drainage and sanitation districts in certain counties (HB5166) and disconnecting park district territory (HB5542).
[26:15] Local Finance & IMRF: Discussing SB2769 (Business District fund transfers), SB2826 (IMRF separation benefits), and SB2836 (increased audit thresholds for FY27).
[29:30] Fire Protection & School Transfers: Updates on HB4292 (ambulance fund transfers), HB4909 (Taft-Hartley/IMRF contributions), and HB4375 (extending school fund transfer periods).
[33:00] School Code Changes: An update covering psychologist qualifications (HB4397, effective July 1, 2027), CPR/AED training (HB4788), staff mental health procedures (HB4862, starting 2028), and service animal handling (SB2761).
[37:30] Rights & Protections: Details on SB2914 (expanded teacher dismissal warnings) and SB3361 (The Jett Hawkins Law regarding religious hairstyles), both effective immediately upon signing.
[39:45] Open Meetings Act: Can you list "Personnel Issues" on a meeting agenda? We review a new binding opinion regarding employee termination and the Open Meetings Act.
[44:15] Upcoming Events: A summary of where to catch Ancel Glink attorneys this summer and fall.

Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary after he refused to stop posting himself in uniform and making derogatory statements on social media in Wenzler v. United States Coast Guard, et al.

Wenzler had been a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary for about 15 years when a member of the public complained about his LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another made a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. The Auxiliary conducted an investigation, and a supervisor directed him to remove from social media any photograph of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to the Auxiliary. He responded that he would not comply with the directive and that he would file a complaint against the supervisor for racist action against him because he was white. He continued to post about his Auxiliary position on LinkedIn and another complaint was filed by a member of the public about one of his posts. He again stated he would not comply with the Auxiliary's social media directive, and formal disciplinary proceedings were started which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling him. After his administrative appeals failed, he sued in federal court claiming the Coast Guard's actions against him violated his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in the Coast Guard's favor, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the standards for a First Amendment retaliation claim, which require a public employee to show that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) their speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. In analyzing the first prong (whether his speech was constitutionally protected), the Court applied the two-step Pickering test: (a) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern and (b) if so, does the speaker's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweigh the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

In this case, the Court accepted that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern (meeting the first step of the Pickering test). However, in applying the second step (balancing interests test), the Court determined that the Coast Guard deserved deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when those members hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. The Auxiliary's structure as a uniformed organization within the Coast Guard with a military-like hierarchy was also relevant to the Court in balacing its interests against Wenzler's. In short, the Court held that the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that Wenzler's speech would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation, and reasonably expect that other members of the Auxiliary would be less likely to work with him because of his derogatory comments and attacks on others. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found no First Amendment violation in the Coast Guard's removal of Wenzler.

Municipal Minute