Updates on Senate Bill 3336 (E-Bikes, etc) and more...

Updates on Senate Bill 3336 (E-Bikes, etc)

We previously reported about Illinois Senate Bill 3336, which if passed by both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and signed by the Governor, would make comprehensive changes to the authority of local governments to regulate several devices and vehicles, including electric mobility devices (EMDs), motor driven cycles, low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles. We wanted to share a couple of updates to the bill, including House Floor Amendments No. 2 and No. 3.

House Floor Amendment No. 2 was introduced on May 11, 2026, and subsequently recommended for adoption by the House Transportation: Vehicles and Safety Committee. This amendment would make several additional noteworthy changes to Senate Bill 3336, some of which are summarized below.

If passed, the amendment would authorize park districts, forest preserve districts, conservation districts, and transit districts, by ordinance or resolution, to regulate the use of EMDs, low-speed gas bicycles, and low-speed electric bicycles on bicycle paths in their respective jurisdictions. This proposed change is important, because Senate Bill 3336 otherwise expressly preempts local governments (including home rule units) from regulating EMDs, motor driven cycles, low-speed gas bicycles, and low-speed electric bicycles.

If passed, the amendment would also prohibit persons younger than 18 years old from operating low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters manufactured to accommodate passengers, unless the passenger is a sibling, stepsibling, child, or stepchild of the operator. The amendment would also authorize operating low-speed gas bicycles on any highway, street, roadway, or bicycle lane authorized for use by regular bicycles.

The amendment also makes several important additions regarding mobility devices. Specifically, the amendment clarifies that nothing in the Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits the use of or reasonable accommodation for personal mobility devices when operated by persons with disabilities. The amendment also clarifies that the Vehicle Code’s rules for regular bicycles also apply to “adaptive electric bicycles,” which are defined to mean an electric bicycle with 2 or more wheels that is designed for and used by a person with a mobility disability.

House Floor Amendment No. 3 was introduced on May 21, 2026. If passed, it would add language exempting low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed gas bicycles from the driving while under the influence prohibitions unless the bicycle is capable of and operating in excess of 28 miles per hour.

Stay tuned for more updates as this bill and any future amendments to it proceeds through the Illinois General Assembly.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Village Board Violated OMA by Not Including "General Subject Matter" of Action Item on Agenda

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) in its fifth binding opinion of 2026 for an inadequate agenda. PAC Op. 26-005.

A citizen filed a request for review with the PAC office claiming that a village board violated the OMA at a meeting where it voted on the termination of a village employee. Specifically, the citizen claimed that the agenda only listed "Personnel issues" under a "POLICE & LIQUOR" heading on the agenda, which he claimed was not sufficient to inform the public of the matter on which the village board was intending to take final action. The PAC agreed that the agenda description "Personnel issues" did not provide advance notice of the "general subject matter" of the action that was taken, and that the phrase "Personnel issues" was too broad as it could involve any number of other types of personnel actions, and not just termination of a village employee.

In its opinion, the PAC cited to section 2.02 of OMA that provides that "[a]ny agenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting." As discussed in the past, the PAC appears to take a very expansive view of section 2.02 that would include actions taken by public bodies beyond votes on resolutions or ordinances (which section 2.02 seems to apply to). The PAC has applied section 2.02 to any type of action taken by a public body at a meeting, to include motions that do not involve an ordinance or resolution, even though the language of 2.02 expressly states that it applies to "the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance..." (emphasis added). While unclear from the PAC opinion, it is possible that the village board may have acted on the termination via a resolution or ordinance, which would then clearly fall under section 2.02. In any event, it is advisable that an agenda of a meeting of a public body be sufficiently descriptive to inform the public of items that will be voted on at the meeting, whether those actions fall under 2.02 or otherwise.

PAC Finds City Council in Violation of OMA for Closed Session Discussions

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 4th binding opinion of 2026 finding a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by discussing matters in closed session that were not outside the scope of a closed session exemption. PAC Op. 26-004.

A citizen filed an OMA complaint with the PAC claiming that a city council improperly held closed sessions to discuss the potential renovation of city hall and plans for a new city hall. In response to the complaint, the city argued that the city council discussed whether or not the city needed to look at purchasing land to build a new city hall, including discussing several properties that were listed for sale or that could be purchased. The city argued these discussions were proper under section 2(c)(5) of the OMA.

After listening to the verbatim tapes of the closed sessions, the PAC determined that part of the city council's discussions went beyond the scope of the OMA because they focused on the condition of the city hall property and financial matters, which the PAC determined were not proper under 2(c)(5) of the OMA. As a result, the PAC ordered the city to release that part of the verbatim recordings that exceeded the scope of the OMA but determined that the city council's discussions relating to purchase of property for a new city hall could be withheld as those discussions were within the scope of 2(c)(5) of the OMA.

Prosser Rule Applied to City Council's Appointment of Clerk

It isn't often that the Illinois courts apply the "Prosser Rule" to the vote of a city council, but an Illinois Appellate Court did just that recently in Christian v. Buscher.

In 2025, a city council held a special meeting to vote on the appointment of a person to fill a vacant city clerk position. The city council (made up of 10 elected aldermen and the mayor) voted five "yea," three "nay," and two "present" on the motion to approve an ordinance to appoint a sitting alderman to fill the clerk position. The mayor (who did not vote) announced that the measure passed. The alderman who was being appointed voted in favor of his appointment.

A citizen filed a lawsuit to challenge the vote on the appointment, arguing that the measure did not receive the necessary six votes to approve an ordinance. Specifically, the citizen argued that the two "present" votes should not have been counted towards the majority who did vote in favor of the measure. The citizen also argued that the favorable vote of the alderman who was being appointed should not have been counted. The circuit court dismissed the case and it was appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first analyzed the Illinois Supreme Court's Prosser v. Village of Fox Lake case where the Supreme Court held that an ordinance was validly approved even though a member of the board was present but did not vote, finding that the non-vote counted towards the majority of "yea" votes. The Court explained that if a measure requires an "affirmative" vote of the majority, then "voting to 'abstain,' or to 'pass,' or voting 'present' or of refusing to vote when present at a meeting" counts as a "nay" vote. However, if a measure requires a "concurrence" vote of the majority, a vote of pass, present, abstain, or a failure to vote counts as an acquiescence or concurrence with the majority, based on the "general rule" that those members present at a meeting "must vote against a proposal in order to defeat it."

Because the city ordinances required a "concurrence of a majority" to pass an ordinance, the Court found that the ordinance being challenged was validly approved because the two "present" votes were properly counted with the "yea" votes based on the Prosser Rule. The Court also rejected the argument that the vote of the alderman being appointed should not have been counted, finding that even without his vote, the measure passed. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the case challenging the appointment.

Removal of Tow Company from County Tow List Not a Due Process Violation

In Tire Town Auto, LLC v. Wood County, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found no due process violation when a county removed a tow company from the county's tow list.

A Wisconsin county maintained a list of towing businesses that were available on a rotating basis to recover vehicles on public roads. After receiving complaints about one of the tow companies, the county removed it from the list and the company sued, claiming the county violated its procedural due process rights in removing it from from the tow list. The county asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing there is no protected property interest in being listed on the county's tow list. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, and the company appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the tow company did not allege or identify any written or other source that would support a property interest, including a statute, regulation, or ordinance that would guarantee a business a spot on the county's tow list. As a result, the case was properly dismissed.

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