When I studied comparative politics as an undergraduate in the 1990s, I was introduced to the field through static comparisons between national political systems. Each chapter in the textbook we read described a different country, and we learned about ...
When I studied comparative politics as an undergraduate in the 1990s, I was introduced to the field through static comparisons between national political systems. Each chapter in the textbook we read described a different country, and we learned about constitutions, legislatures, and parties as if they were fixed features of political life.
That approach has long since been overtaken by events. Today’s students live in a world where party systems are changing from election to election, new technologies are transforming political participation and communication, and authoritarian rulers are coming up with new ways of grabbing and holding on to power.
How should we teach comparative politics in this rapidly changing environment? That’s something I thought about when I sat down to write my new textbook, An Introduction to Comparative Politics. My answer has four parts.
1. Get to the key concepts and ideas right away
Scholars of comparative politics ask two big questions: why are political systems so different from one another, and how do those differences matter for people’s lives? If we help students understand why those two questions are so important and guide them as they learn about the main differences between political systems, we can put them on a life-long journey of discovery. Today’s students have easy access to reasonably accurate data on political systems via their computers and their phones, so it’s not factual information they need from us—they need concepts and ideas they can use to make sense of the information that is available to them.
2. Take a global view
The modern discipline of comparative politics developed in America and Europe in the nineteenth century, and it has long treated the institutions of North American and Western European democracies as the standard against which all other systems are measured. That attitude never made much sense, and it makes less sense today than ever, since many of today’s political challenges and conflicts have a global scope. Today’s students are eager to understand how the key concepts and ideas of comparative politics travel across continents—or, as is sometimes the case, they don’t.
3. Talk about historical change
The turn away from static comparisons between national political systems also requires that we pay attention to processes of historical change, continuities, and resurgences.
It is remarkable how much history has been repeating itself lately. Over the last two decades, leading comparativists have presented in-depth analyses of “electoral authoritarianism”—conducting multi-party elections in de facto authoritarian regimes. As Theodore Zeldin showed in the 1950s, Napoleon III’s regime in France in the 1850s and 1860s had all the hallmarks of electoral authoritarianism. Other comparativists have examined the rise of populism. Donald Trump’s rise to power in the United States has a lot in common with Georges Boulanger’s meteoric political career in France in the 1880s.
4. Emphasize data and methods
For better or worse, we live in a data-driven world, and whatever our students choose to do when they’re done studying, they’re going to need basic data literacy skills. This makes it all the more important for us as teachers to emphasize that comparative politics isn’t just a set of facts to memorize—it is a way of thinking about the world. Students need to become familiar with the main methodological approaches in comparative politics right away, including both broad cross-national comparisons and focused case studies. I therefore deemed it essential, when writing An Introduction to Comparative Politics, to present students with up-to-date data and up-to-date empirical examples in all chapters.
By learning the key concepts and ideas, taking a global view, tracing processes of historical continuity and change, and using diverse comparative methods, students can gain the independence of mind they need to make sense of politics throughout their lifetimes.
For academics, stepping into the world of scholarly conferences for the first time can feel like crossing the Rubicon. After months (or sometimes years) of what is often a solitary research journey, scholars enter a dynamic ecosystem where subfields collide and converge, and colleagues at every career stage rub shoulders in line for coffee and conversation.
For Oxford’s two newest politics editors, Morgan Jones and Gabe Kachuck, the recent American Political Science Association annual meeting in Vancouver, Canada, was their first opportunity to experience the rush of new ideas and new faces firsthand. Below, Morgan and Gabe share their initial impressions, memorable moments, and key lessons—for themselves and for future conference delegates.
You were first time attendees at the APSA conference. Any highlights?
We were proud to represent Oxford University Press at one of the field’s largest gatherings. Having a good number of our books together at one booth really brought the list to life, and it was exciting to see old friends, new collaborators, and curious strangers leafing through the range of the categories we’re publishing in. Vancouver itself was a standout: the Convention Centre’s two glass-walled buildings stood handsomely against the cerulean harbor, framed by the mountains and dotted with sea planes taking off and landing. The fresh air was welcome amid back-to-back meetings and sobering discussions about the state of global affairs.
How are scholars responding to the political challenges of our time?
This is a poignant question, following the assassination of American political activist Charlie Kirk. The conference was just getting underway when the news landed; it quickly consumed everyone in attendance, as did the unrest that followed. Responses to the violence were myriad, but the constant was an ever-growing concern for the future of democratic norms. Scholars and researchers at APSA brought a wealth of expertise to this issue and so many others that define our current moment. We were moved by their commitment to asking good questions and developing grounded answers to inform the path forward.
How did you build your schedule?
Planning for the conference began a month or so prior to our flights to Vancouver. Because we are both new editors at OUP, we are still in the process of meeting all the authors we’ve inherited from our predecessor. In building our schedules, we aimed to strike a balance between chatting with these authors about their progress and connecting with others whose work is of interest, for a variety of different reasons. We met a mix of early-career researchers and experienced scholars who offered insights into trends and developments in any given subfield. We also left time in our schedules for panels and “down time” at the exhibition booth, where we enjoyed lively, organic conversations about Oxford’s list and what people are up to in the field.
Since you both acquire academic and trade titles for Oxford’s politics list, how did you approach conversations at APSA?
We start our conversations by working to understand what you aim to do and who you want your work to reach, whether that be fellow academics, students, policymakers, practitioners, or general readers. From there, we can offer feedback on whether your book project is set up to effectively meet those goals, and, if so, what might look like if you were to publish an academic, trade, or crossover work with us at OUP. Aligning your needs as author with ours as publisher is key to a successful partnership.
What kind of book proposals or research topics seemed especially compelling or timely?
Our first question when evaluating a proposal is: what’s novel here? That might mean unpublished interviews conducted during fieldwork abroad, newly uncovered census or survey data, or a fresh conceptual approach to understanding the structures that shape power and politics around the world. The proposals that stood out to us at APSA were those with a clear sense of their potential impact—whether on specific subfields or on broader public discourse. We’re always drawn to ambitious arguments or narratives that aim to tackle questions too expansive for a single journal article. Those are the kinds of projects that consistently make us lean in and want to learn more!
Did you attend any panels? If so, were there standout moments or recurring themes caught your attention?
Gabe was able to attend a few panels between meetings, including the Author Meets Critics session for When the Internet Meets Authoritarian Governance: China’s Digital Governance and a paper discussion on nuclear deterrence strategies. It was heartening to hear OUP books cited in both sessions—a reminder of our ongoing impact on the field. The panels offered sharp insights into how political science is engaging with questions of state power in digital and strategic contexts.
One recurring theme across panels and informal conversations was the role of AI in shaping research, scholarship, and teaching. Scholars are clearly grappling with how to integrate these tools into their work and classrooms, and there’s far from a consensus on how best to do so. It’s a space marked by both experimentation and uncertainty, and it’s likely to remain a live conversation for some time.
Now that you’ve attended your first academic conference, do you have any advice for scholars hoping to connect with you and other OUP editors?
Reach out early to request a meeting! Our emails can be found on OUP’s website under Find an Editor. Even if we aren’t able to connect with you during the conference, we’re open to setting up virtual meetings before or after events have wrapped. Or, come by the booth to say hello. We are often on the go, but we enjoy meet-and-greets and would be glad to listen to an elevator pitch of your research interests, works-in-progress, or forthcoming submissions.
Every September, caregivers and kids alike prepare for one big change: the start of a new school year. As the weeks of summer draw to a close, families are cramming in the last moments of summer fun while simultaneously gearing up for school drops offs and new classroom schedules. While it can be an incredibly exciting time, filled with first day of school outfits and new school gear, it can also be incredibly stressful. This can be particularly true for teenagers who, compared to younger kids, are facing higher academic demands and social pressure while experiencing the major physical and developmental changes that come during adolescence. On top of that, a 2023 Center of Disease Control report showed that teens of today have higher rates of mental health concerns, such as anxiety and depression, and that suicidal thoughts and behaviors are increasing. This can make the return to school daunting for teens, as well as parents who are worried about how their child will manage the transition and demands of the year.
Fortunately, there are several tools that parents and caregivers can use to prepare kids and teens for the first few weeks in September. This includes setting clear expectations, skills to encourage helpful behavior, and strategies that help kids feel supported by their parents.
Setting expectations
While many kids prefer to keep their heads in the sand when it comes to a new academic cycle, it can be incredibly helpful to set expectations for the school year a few weeks in advance. The most basic version of this includes outlining differences between summer versus school schedules, such as changes to sleep and wake times, limits to screens, or daily responsibilities. This preview can help kids’ brains prepare for the upcoming shifts in their daily lives and make the transition a little smoother. It’s also a great idea to talk to kids about how the upcoming school year might be different than the last one. This could include providing information on class size, the structure of the day, or increased expectations. The goal is not to scare your kids about everything coming their way, but rather to provide them with simple clear information in a manner that builds excitement. For example, “It’s so fun that you get to go to go off-campus for lunch this year. I bet it will make the day feel way more interesting!” Or, “I know high school is bigger than middle school. It may feel a little overwhelming, but it’s also such a great time for you to see how capable you are.”
Encouraging positive behaviors
Once expectations have been set, parents can also work to encourage brave or skillful behavior. This may include things like taking more responsibility (e.g., managing their own communication with teachers and coaches), growing outside of their comfort zone (e.g., joining a new club or social circle), or challenging themselves with new opportunities or roles (e.g., a first job or harder courseload). This most effective way to do this is through a skill called “labeled praise.”
Labeled praise is when you show appreciation for a specific behavior or characteristic your child is demonstrating. When it comes to a new school year, parents can look for opportunities to praise preparation, flexibility, and bravery. For example, “I know you really loved your teachers last year, and I appreciate how openminded you are about your new schedule.” Another parent may say, “Great call on getting to bed a little earlier this week. It’ll make the start of school so much easier!” For teens who haven’t mastered brave or skillful choices, parents can offer cheerleading and encouragement. Phrases like “I know you’re going to do a beautiful job making friends because you’ve done it before!” or “10th grade is tough, and I have total confidence that you’re going to find a way to balance everything” send a message that they really believe in their kid. This can go a long way towards encouraging positive behaviors.
Providing validation
When you do notice your child having a hard time, whether it’s nerves, low mood, or difficulty organizing themselves for a new semester, it’s always a great idea to offer validation. Validation is a skill used to show somebody that you can see their perspective or understand where they are coming from. Validation can be a tricky skill to master for caregivers because it is sometimes hard to put yourself in your child’s shoes, or you are eager to get them to see a new perspective. For example, when your child complains about their new math teacher who they have heard is a hard grader, it’s tempting to say “Nah! I’m sure it’ll be fine!” This may work for some kids. However, it can come off as dismissive and hard to believe for a teen whose anxiety or stress is high. Instead, try validation: “It makes sense that you’re nervous based on what you’ve heard!” While you aren’t agreeing with your child’s worries, you are acknowledging them, and that can help increase a sense of connection and communication. Once your child feels understood, they’ll be better able to think clearly about the situation and problem solve as needed.
As you navigate another year of permission slips, homework, and extracurricular activities, remember that you have a handful of tools in your pocket to help ease the way. With a little bit of preparation, encouragement, and support, you and child can start the school year off on a great foot.
The financialization of Western economies has unfolded as a prolonged systemic failure. What began as a mechanism to support productive enterprise has evolved into a structural dominance of finance over the real economy. Through deregulation, the proliferation of speculative activity, and successive asset bubbles, the sector has prioritized short-term gains over long-term investment. The 2008 financial crisis underscored these dynamics, transferring the burdens of systemic risk to the broader public while financial institutions were largely shielded from the consequences. This trajectory has entrenched income inequality and contributed to the political capture of regulatory institutions, inhibiting meaningful reform.
In contrast, China presents a divergent model. Its state-led financialization exemplifies a proactive deployment of financial mechanisms in service of national industrial objectives. Unlike the market-driven financialization typical of advanced Western economies, China’s approach is characterized by strategic state intervention and institutional design. The government not only participates in markets but reconfigures them—mobilizing state-owned enterprises as venture capital vehicles, directing bank lending toward emerging technologies, and leveraging local government financing platforms to support innovation. This model represents a deliberate recalibration of financial systems to prioritize long-term technological development over immediate capital returns.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs): from asset managers to venture capitalists
Chinese SOEs have increasingly transitioned from passive asset holders to active financial agents, functioning as quasi–venture capital entities with a targeted focus on high-technology sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing. This transformation is rooted in the 2013 reforms under Xi Jinping, which marked a shift in state asset governance from a model of “managing assets” to one of “managing capital.” Central to this new framework are state-owned capital investment and operation companies (SCIOCs)—market-oriented entities tasked with allocating state capital in alignment with national strategic objectives.
Prominent SCIOCs such as Guoxin and Chengtong exemplify this model, channeling investments into key technological domains while retaining mechanisms of state oversight. Notably, their investment strategies increasingly resemble those of global institutional investors like BlackRock, characterized by portfolio diversification and minority equity stakes across a wide range of publicly listed firms. Over time, both Guoxin and Chengtong have reduced the size of their individual holdings while broadening the scope of their portfolios, mirroring BlackRock’s index-based approach. However, unlike BlackRock, whose investment logic is primarily driven by market signals and shareholder value maximization, these Chinese entities operate within a state-directed paradigm. Their capital allocation decisions are subordinated to broader industrial policy objectives, underscoring a distinctive model of “state-capital hybridization” wherein global financial practices are repurposed to advance national technological priorities.
Banks: from conservative lenders to investment partners
China’s banking sector has undergone a significant transformation from a traditionally conservative, loan-centric model—once governed by the “separation principle” that delineated clear boundaries between lending and investment—toward a more integrated, market-oriented system. Since 2015, mechanisms such as “investment and loan linkage” have enabled commercial banks to engage in equity-related activities, particularly in support of high-technology enterprises. Institutions like the Bank of China have introduced “green channel” loans that prioritize lending to startups with venture capital backing, and in some cases have experimented with convertible instruments such as “stock option models,” allowing for the conversion of debt into equity.
This evolution has been further institutionalized through the establishment of bank wealth management companies (BWMCs), which are permitted to make direct equity investments in high-tech firms. As of the end of 2022, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) had approved 29 such entities. One notable example is BOCOM International, affiliated with the Bank of Communications, which manages the BOCOM Science and Technology Innovation Fund—an investment vehicle explicitly oriented toward advancing technological innovation. These developments underscore a broader trend of financial re-engineering within the Chinese banking system, as state-affiliated financial institutions adopt quasi-investor roles to support national strategic priorities, reinforcing the architecture of state-led financialization.
Local governments: trading land speculation for innovation funding
In recent years, Chinese local governments have transitioned away from reliance on Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs), traditionally used to support land-based urban development, toward the deployment of Government Guidance Funds (GGFs). This strategic reorientation marks a shift from speculative real estate-driven financing to a model of purposeful financialization aimed at fostering technological innovation. Rather than leveraging land assets to finance urban expansion, local authorities are increasingly channeling capital into science and technology sectors through state-backed investment vehicles.
A prominent example is the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (NICIIF), with a targeted fund size of approximately USD 95.8 billion, which supports enterprises in strategically vital sectors such as semiconductors. These funds operate not merely as instruments of capital allocation but as policy tools through which local governments execute central industrial strategies. According to the Zero2IPO database, as of 2023, there were 2,086 active GGFs across China, collectively managing assets exceeding USD 1.8 trillion. This proliferation underscores a broader recalibration of subnational fiscal behavior, whereby the objectives of economic development and industrial policy are fused within a state-directed financial architecture oriented toward national technological advancement.
A coordinated push for tech supremacy
This evolving model of state-led financialization reflects a deliberate integration of financial instruments with industrial policy, positioning the state as what we termed as “financial entrepreneur.” In this capacity, the state assumes a dual function: both as a strategic investor in capital markets and as a fund manager whose objectives are shaped through a hybrid of administrative directive and market logic. The recalibration of incentives across state institutions—ranging from banks and SOEs to local governments—facilitates the targeted allocation of financial resources toward sectors deemed essential for national technological leadership.
This coordinated mobilization contrasts sharply with earlier phases of development finance in China, which were heavily reliant on infrastructure-led investment through Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs). The current financial architecture instead orients capital toward innovation and industrial upgrading. As illustrated in the accompanying figure, this shift embodies a paradigmatic change in the underlying logic of state intervention. The empirical results are notable: according to a 2023 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), China now leads globally in 37 out of 44 critical technologies, including advanced batteries, quantum sensing, and 5G communications.
State–finance relationship through GGFs. Figure 8, “Mapping the investor state: state-led financialization in accelerating technological innovation in China,” Socio-Economic Review, 18 June 2025.
A growing network of state agencies in innovation finance ecosystem is to ensure ideological alignment and managerial oversight, forming a core feature of China’s model of state-led financialization. This system also serves as a reminder of the original rationale behind China’s economic reform process where the boundaries between public and private sectors, and between liberal market coordination and socialist planning, become increasingly blurred. Notwithstanding its strategic coherence, China’s model of state-led financialization faces a series of structural and operational challenges. One key risk lies in the emergence of overcapacity within state-targeted sectors such as photovoltaics and electric vehicles. In the absence of commensurate demand, excessive production may generate inefficiencies, underutilized assets, and financial losses. Furthermore, the expansive use of mechanisms like GGFs has the potential to inflate asset bubbles, as state-directed capital may push valuations beyond sustainable levels, raising concerns over long-term financial stability.
The persistence of so-called “zombie firms”—enterprises maintained through state support despite chronic unprofitability—also continues to divert capital from more productive uses, undermining allocative efficiency. Tensions emerge from the dual imperative to stimulate market-based innovation while retaining centralized Party and state control over capital flows. These competing logics often complicate investment decisions and diminish the responsiveness of the financial system. Additionally, fragmented coordination across state entities and growing international scrutiny or resistance to China’s state-capitalist practices further limit the replicability and effectiveness of this model.
For Western economies, the implications are profound. Initiatives such as the U.S. Stargate Project—reportedly valued at $500 billion over four years to support AI and semiconductor infrastructure—and the European Commission’s InvestAI scheme, backed by €20 billion in guarantees, signal a renewed policy interest in public–private coordination. However, these efforts remain constrained by political fragmentation and a reliance on market-led frameworks. China’s approach is characterized by a level of centralized state capacity and institutional discipline that would be difficult to replicate without foundational political transformation in the West.
Should China succeed in sustaining this model without triggering systemic instability, the result would extend beyond technological leadership. It would represent a paradigmatic shift in the global political economy—one that challenges prevailing liberal capitalist orthodoxy and compels a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between the state, capital, and innovation. In this sense, China is not merely competing within existing rules but reshaping the terrain on which economic competition is conducted.
‘Where do you want to go today?’ served as the tagline for software giant Microsoft’s global marketing campaign running through the mid-1990s. The accompanying advertisements were replete with flashy images of people around the world of all ages, ethnicities, and backgrounds engaging in a diverse range of activities, including business, education, video games, artistic expression, socializing, and research, to name some of the most prominent examples. The slogan ‘Where do you want to go today?’ implied that people were largely free to travel where they wished, but, of course, Microsoft was selling the power of its software to facilitate the free flow of information and communication, and by extension greater connectivity and collaboration, among people around the world, rather than the actual movement of people.
Yet combined with rapid advances in hardware and software, the tagline captured something of a popular mood of the time. Within many Western societies, the end of the Cold War, the continued liberalization of international trade and travel through a variety of supranational institutions and international agreements, and the growing clout of transnational corporations and nongovernment organizations heralded the coming of a borderless world. The prospect of unprecedented, unfettered mobility and connectivity for an ever-growing number of people seemed imminent.
Looking back thirty years later, those expectations were overly optimistic. It is impossible to deny the truly remarkable technological advances—personal computers, the internet, mobile phones, and wireless communications—that compress space and bridge territories. Yet far from a borderless world, the first decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed a resurgence of borders with impacts on a variety of political, socioeconomic, environmental, technological, and human rights issues.
In fact, borders have been central to two of the most significant events of the 2020s, namely the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic saw governments, with varying degrees of severity and effectiveness, impose border controls, restrict domestic and international travel, and implement systems of confinement and quarantine. These measures disrupted global supply chains and confined millions of people to their homes as their freedom to attend school, go to work, gather for worship, or even simply shop for daily essentials was restricted. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also disrupted global trade networks, while ravaging large swathes of Ukrainian territory, displacing millions of civilians, and prompting massive increases in defense spending far beyond the direct combatants.
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of international and civil conflicts roiling the international scene. The attacks by Hamas militants from the Gaza Strip into Israel in 2023 prompted Israeli retaliatory attacks and eventually a full-scale invasion into Gaza. This, in turn, gave rise to a series of broader, overlapping regional conflicts involving dozens of state and non-state combatants, including Hezbollah and Houthi militants in Lebanon and Yemen respectively and Iranian and Israeli attacks and counterattacks. That turmoil provided at least proximate triggers for the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in 2024, leaving that country divided among a mixture of forces representing a provisional government, various sectarian militias with unclear allegiances, and remnants of Islamic State forces. Syrian territory also hosts American, Russian, and Turkish armed forces, in some ways resembling the proxy conflicts of the Cold War.
While the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East have dominated headlines, other armed struggles have flared and persisted across the North African, Sahel, South Asian, and Central Asian regions. Afghanistan, Congo, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen remain gripped, at least in part, by civil strife and border disputes stretching back years, if not decades. Beyond the battlefield death and destruction, these conflicts have broader consequences, including refugee flows, economic dislocation and poverty, and malnutrition and hunger, among other problems.
Looming menacingly in the background is the specter of renewed great power competition, primarily between the United States with its global alliance system and the burgeoning partnerships between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as well as other like-minded authoritarian regimes. After years of forging economic interdependencies, China has been increasingly assertive in projecting power across the Indo-Pacific realm, especially regarding its claims over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Himalayas. The United States has responded with calls to ‘pivot to Asia’ based on targeted sanctions and a general decoupling from China’s economy, strengthening alliances stretching from East Asia through Southeast Asia and Oceania into the Indian basin, and more robust and forward military deployments across the region. Ramifications of great power conflict across the Indo-Pacific realm would greatly exceed the calamities of other ongoing wars.
This blog has summarized, admittedly in broad strokes, the shift from relative optimism in the 1990s—characterized by aspirations for a more collaborative and interconnected global community—to a world confronted by profound challenges in which borders will play central roles through the coming decades. Beyond this focus on larger-scale geopolitics and hard international power, borders are central to a variety of other issues across multiple scales, including debates about trade and tariffs, citizenship and immigration, crime, surveillance and privacy, and cultural change and human rights, to name a few. Headlines on any day offer striking examples of issues and events involving borders.
Given the salience of borders to such an array of pressing issues, Oxford University Press has launched Oxford Intersections: Borders to provide the latest border research, highlighting this field’s broad relevance. Borders are shown to be simultaneously positive and negative, often in the same place and at the same time to different people. Borders remain a prime modality of defining and enacting power across multiple scales. This collection seeks to reveal how, where, why, by whom, and to what effect that power and aspiration of territorial control is exercised. We hope readers will engage Oxford Intersections: Borders to encounter new perspectives on a topic that is elemental to human experience and foundational to the form and function of power.
